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Preface 
For several years, International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) has sought to introduce critical 
issues of global affairs to members of future generations of scholars and policy-makers. 
Through this volume of the ISYP Yearbook 2007, we thus continue our endeavour of 
highlighting and analysing issued germane to the survival of humankind. 
The contributions in this volume focus on a foundational topic of the Pugwash 
movement, namely, the risks of nuclear proliferation. Thus, Immaculate Motsi presents some 
of obligations and possibilities posed by the report of the Commission of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction; Moeed Yusuf deliberates on the consequences of the nuclear pact reached 
between India and the United States; Sebnem Udum discusses the complexities of Turkey’s 
relationship with nuclear weapons as seen from the main theoretical standpoints of 
international relations; and Hans Tolkoen and Arthur Petersen analyse the role of Pugwash in 
the Middle East, particularly in connection to the conflict between Palestine and Israel.  
This issue, however, also reminds us of the wide perspective one must adopt when 
confronting international conflict. The roots and multifaceted fuels of war are assessed, in 
different manners, by numerous authors. Hence, Kate Marvel and Jean-Andre Okito Lokake 
introduce the efforts of the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences in increasing the 
opportunity of access to high-quality courses for graduate and undergraduate students in 
Africa; Eli Lipetz looks into the role of the market for opium in Afghanistan; Antoinette 
Hildering writes of the state of international law in relation to the abuse of power; and 
Aleksandra Dzisiow engages with a timely issue, that is, the relation between Islam and the so-
called West. 
Support from members of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the 
members of the Editorial and Advisory Boards, the additional reviewers and the Board 
members of Pugwash Netherlands, was invaluable for the completion of this book. I 
particularly acknowledge the patience of the contributors to this developing project. 
 
 
Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra 
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Opium and Afghanistan 
Eli Lipetz 
University of Western Ontario, Department of Political Science, 
London, Ontario, Canada; elipetz@hotmail.com. 
 
 
The Afghan opium economy presents a clear and present danger to international security as it 
enhances the chances of failed states emerging, of stable regions destabilising, and of human 
poverty, addiction, and disease proliferating. The root cause of the Afghan opium economy is 
the great number of domestic farmers who cultivate the crop. Thus, the factors that compel 
rural farmers to cultivate opium cause the manifestation of the opium economy in 
Afghanistan, and the subsequent insecurity that afflicts the international community. In this 
article, the root causes and security implications of the Afghan opium economy are analysed, 
and several policy options and recommendations are presented and evaluated. The illegal 
opium economy in Afghanistan is not a recent phenomenon. To date, there has been a 
reliance on traditional approaches to combat the drug problem in the country. This must stop. 
There are no quick and easy solutions. Instead, there are only long and multi-layered 
solutions, which need commitment, support, and open-mindedness. The world community 
must understand this, and act upon it. Otherwise, the opium economy will continue to 
dominate in Afghanistan, and insecurity will continue to plague much of the international 
community. 
Probable causes 
During its war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the Soviet Union (SU) encountered stiff resistance 
from mujahidin guerillas. Rural Afghanis backed these mujahidin, and provided them with 
support in the form food, water, shelter, and medical aid [1]. In hopes of harming the rural 
population and thereby weakening the mujahidin’s support network, the SU attacked the 
agricultural sector [2]; aerial sorties destroyed vital infrastructure such as roads and irrigation 
systems [3], and scorched earth campaigns turned ‘entire regions that once were fertile (into) 
areas of barren waste’ [4]. From a Soviet standpoint, these tactics were successful, as the 
cultivation of licit crops traditionally grown by Afghani farmers declined during the war [5]. 
Corresponding with this decline was a rise in opium cultivation, as farmers increasingly 
switched to the illicit crop during the war [6]. This switch occurred because traditional crops 
need fertile land, irrigation, and quick road access to markets [7], whereas opium can grow on 
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most types of soil, it requires minimal irrigation, and its lightweight and non-perishable nature 
allow for easy transport [8].  
Although the SU left Afghanistan, the conditions that compelled farmers to switch to 
opium cultivation remained. Governmental neglect is to blame for this, as rural reconstruction 
was never a priority for the Communist (1978-1992), Mujahidin (1992-1996), or Taliban 
regimes (1996-2001) that ruled Afghanistan [9]. The collapse of the Taliban in 2001 ended this 
trend of neglect. In its place came a new era marked by increased reconstruction and 
development programmes. However, this increase occurred, and continues to occur, in an 
uneven pattern [10].  
Uneven patterns occur due to security issues, as reconstruction programmes may only take 
place in regions deemed sufficiently secure [11]. Due to this condition, the insecure 
agriculturally oriented countryside has not been a focal point of reconstruction and 
development efforts. Consequently, much of the infrastructure damaged in the past has 
remained unusable [12]. These dynamics are similar to the Cold War dynamics, as 
infrastructural constraints continue to hinder the cultivation of licit crops. Given that these 
infrastructural limitations do not apply to opium cultivation, it is understandable why farmers 
currently choose to grow this crop.  
Additional incentive for cultivating opium results from the nature of Afghanistan’s 
informal banking system. Most farmers take out loans on a yearly basis in order to satisfy basic 
needs such as purchasing food, clothing, medical services, and agricultural inputs [13]. The 
most widely used method of obtaining loans involves opium as a source of credit; farmers 
receive a loan by agreeing to cultivate a predetermined amount of opium that is to be 
transferred to the creditor at a later date [14]. This particular method is in wide use because 
opium provides the greatest access to loans, and the most favourable interest rates, when 
compared to other forms of credit [15]. With so many needs to satisfy, and so few means for 
satisfying these needs, it is only natural that farmers would choose the opium option.  
Unfortunately, satisfying these needs became increasingly difficult for opium farmers in 
recent years, as widespread crop failure, governmental bans, and eradication efforts caused 
yields to be lower than expected [16]. Lower yields led some farmers to initially default on their 
loans, as they were unable to grow the predetermined amount of opium. While some were 
eventually able to repay their loans, others were less fortunate; as of 2005, over one–third of 
farmers had an outstanding loan to pay [17].  
Farmers with outstanding loans have several means with which they can manage their 
debt. They may opt to sell or mortgage their land, give their daughter to marriage, grow licit 
crops, or work wage labour to supplement their farm earning [18]. Alternatively, they may 
choose to cultivate opium. This latter option is the one that is the most preferred and widely 
employed, as many consider it the best debt management strategy in contemporary 
Afghanistan [19]. At an age where debts have proliferated, this preference has contributed 
significantly to the rising levels of opium cultivation in the country. 
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Security implications 
Weakening of the Afghan state 
 
According to Antonio Maria Costa, director of the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and 
Crime, the Afghan opium economy is ‘now a clear and present danger’ [20]. Costa is of the 
belief that ‘there is a palpable risk that Afghanistan will again turn into a failed state’ [21]. State 
failure is quite possible given the prominence of the opium economy, and the adverse 
influence that this economy has on Afghanistan’s stability. Elucidating this influence is the 
Failed State Index as espoused by the Fund for Peace [22]. The Failed State Index calculates 
Afghanistan’s proximity to becoming a failed state based on twelve indicators that have 
historically been prominent in bringing about failure to a nation. Of the twelve indicators, 
numerous are closely related to, and exacerbated by, the Afghan opium economy [23].  
Enhancing the scope of the external intervention in Afghanistan is the fact that foreign 
forces have been, and continue to be, involved in counter-narcotic operations. Operations of 
this sort have worked to antagonise certain Afghan parties. Some of these parties have 
responded by sending their opium-funded security apparatuses who operate as a ‘state within a 
state’ to wage violent campaigns, in hopes of stifling the counter-narcotic efforts [24]. In turn, 
these campaigns of violence have caused the displacement of thousands of people [25], which 
has intensified the movement of internally displaced persons. Campaigns of opium-funded 
violence have as well led to uneven patterns of development. Uneven patterns arise because 
areas that are free of opium funded-violence receive more development assistance than regions 
that are plagued by the same type of violence [26]. The further exacerbation of these factors by 
the presence of the opium economy may cause Afghanistan to degenerate into a failed state. It 
would be very detrimental if such a scenario were to materialise, as ‘failed states serve as safe 
havens and staging grounds for terrorist activities, and create environments that spur wider 
regional conflict which carry significant security costs to neighboring countries’ [27].  
Strengthening the Taliban 
Recent reports suggest that resurgent Taliban forces have forged an alliance with opium 
traffickers; in return for protecting traffickers and farmers, the Taliban receives a share of the 
profits accrued from the opium trade [28]. Taliban forces in turn use this capital to finance 
weapons and equipment procurement [29], to pay combatant wages [30], and to entice recruits 
to join their cause [31]. With more weapons, equipment, and operatives, the Taliban is better 
able to wage its insurgency campaign. This opium-funded campaign undermines human 
security at present time, and it has the capacity to continue doing so in the future.  
Human security suffers presently due to the Taliban’s use of tactics that aim to terrorise 
the population [32]. In the future, human security will suffer if the Taliban’s opium-funded 
campaign propels them back into power. This is the case, as the Taliban, during its previous 
stint in power, and throughout its recent campaign, have shown a flagrant and constant 
disregard for the human rights of women [33]. It is likely that this disregard would continue 
and become even more pervasive if the Taliban reassume control in Afghanistan.  
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Strengthening of al Qaeda 
Islamic charities sympathetic to al Qaeda’s cause have historically been its main source of 
financing. The anti-terror campaigns that ensued following 9/11 targeted charities of this 
nature, and in the process diminished their ability to divert funds to al Qaeda [34]. To offset 
this loss of income, al Qaeda, according to the American intelligence community, ‘has turned 
to the poppy fields of Afghanistan as barter to finance its operations’ [35]. More specifically, al 
Qaeda generates capital by levying a tax on each opium shipment that passes through its area 
of influence [36]. Capital accrued in this manner is subsequently used by al Qaeda to fund its 
operations in Afghanistan, and in areas of the former SU [37]. Regions where al Qaeda is active 
may in turn suffer through episodes of indiscriminate violence that have the potential to inflict 
death and injury to many. 
Weakening of security in the region 
A majority of Afghani opium ends up in Europe after being trafficked through Central Asia 
[38]. Corrupt government officials in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia help 
facilitate the flow of drugs through the region [39]. This poses a threat to international security 
because corrupt regimes tend to breed poverty and terrorism [40]. Traffickers who enjoy these 
kinds of ‘political favors’ include transnational criminal organisations such as the Chechen and 
Russian mafias [41]. Groups of this type, who by virtue of the opium trade become financially 
stronger, affect people’s sense of security by engaging in arms dealing, corruption, bank fraud, 
and money laundering [42]. Greater financial strength has as well allowed some of these groups 
to divert finances to separatist groups in Chechnya [43]. This is of great concern vis-à-vis 
international security, as there is fear that the Chechen conflict might spillover the border and 
lead to regional instability [44]. 
Weakening the security of opiate users and their communities 
Afghani opiates and the various drugs derived from it are highly addictive. These addictive 
properties lead to over-consumption and abuse, which in turn enhances the likelihood of drug 
users dying. With an increasing supply of Afghani opiates, deaths are becoming more common. 
One telling statistic regarding the frequency of death is the fact that Afghani heroin alone is the 
cause of approximately 75,000 deaths every year [45]. As well as enhancing the likelihood of 
death, the use of Afghani heroin enhances the odds that an individual will contract a disease; 
HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C rates amongst users of Afghani heroin are disproportionately 
high, as many of these individuals inject the drug with contaminated needles [46].  
Along with the enhanced likelihood of death and disease, users of opiates experience 
greater than average human insecurity. This occurs because consumers often devote whatever 
money they have to quelling drug cravings rather than to satisfying basic needs such as hunger 
and shelter. When opiate consumers run out of money for quelling their drug cravings, they 
frequently turn to crime. For example, in England, which imports 90% of its heroin from 
Afghanistan [47], an estimated three quarters of heroin addicts partake in criminal activities to 
fund their habit [48]. Such drug induced criminal behaviour raises the level of insecurity in the 
community. 
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Policy options and recommendations 
Eradication 
Eradication is both a proactive and reactive counter-narcotic programme that is currently in 
use in Afghanistan. It works to proactively dissuade farmers from growing illicit crops. The 
rationale for this proactive approach is as follows: when faced with the prospects of their crops 
being destroyed, farmers will have greater incentive to abandon the cultivation of opium, and 
instead choose to grow legal crops. When farmers nonetheless cultivate opium, it seeks to 
reactively disrupt the drug trade by physically destroying the illicit crops [49].  
Eradication programmes are on the whole more successful and widespread in secure 
regions than they are in insecure regions. Due to the varying levels of security throughout the 
country, uneven patterns of eradication have emerged [50]. The effects of this imbalance are 
notable, as perceptions that the state is giving preferential treatment to certain ethnic and tribal 
groups have surfaced. Perceptions of this type are undesirable due to their ability to exacerbate 
pre-existing ethnic divisions that are prominent in the country [51]. Feelings of ill will also arise 
because eradication programmes destroy livelihoods. Without an income, farmers have a more 
difficult time satisfying basic needs and paying back loans on schedule. Consequently, some 
farmers may experience greater impoverishment and debt due to the eradication of their crops 
[52].  
Compensatory eradication schemes aim to ease the economic hardships that farmers may 
endure due to the eradication of their crop. This nuanced approach provides monetary 
reimbursements to poppy farmers who consent to having their crops eradicated [53]. Despite 
its good intentions, this scheme is undesirable as it inspires popular resentment vis-à-vis the 
government who runs the programme. Resentment arises because compensatory sums of 
money promised to farmers at times remain undelivered. When compensation does reach the 
farmers, the financial sums are small one-time payments that require foregoing significant long-
term payments [54]. Thus, compensatory and regular eradication programmes are 
inappropriate, as they have the ‘potential to feed the insurgency and terrorism by losing the 
hearts and minds of the people’ [55]. 
Interdiction 
Opium interdiction programmes are common in present day Afghanistan. The goal of 
interdiction is to decrease narcotics trafficking by seizing opium, destroying processing labs, 
and arresting high volume traffickers [56]. If the programme is successful, destruction will 
come upon the drug economy’s infrastructure, and imprisonment will come upon its 
participants. The greater chances of infrastructural damage and jail time will raise the costs of 
participation in the economy, which will in turn work to dissuade individuals from joining due 
to fear of imprisonment and financial loss. Consequently, farmers will lose incentive to 
cultivate the crop, as there will be substantially fewer customers for its product. However, the 
fact that interdiction programmes manage to alienate Afghani warlords provides a 
counterweight to its perceived virtues [57].  
In order to secure and stabilise Afghanistan, there is a need for local human intelligence. 
Warlords, who supply this type of intelligence, are often involved in the drug trade. Herein lies 
the problem, as it is unlikely that warlords will be willing to provide intelligence assistance to 
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the very same forces that are destroying their business [58]. Given how important it is to 
secure and stabilise Afghanistan, it is essential not to alienate warlords, and therefore, 
interdiction is not a viable short-term solution.  
Drug amnesty 
Amnesty programmes aim to minimise the impact warlords have on the opium economy, and 
to maximise the impact they have on security operations. Under the framework of such a 
programme, warlords will receive legal pardons for past wrongdoings in exchange for their 
future abstention from the opium economy [59]. With the removal of warlords and their 
associates from the drug trade, Afghani opiates will have more difficulty reaching consumption 
markets. Concurrently, farmers will have less incentive to cultivate the crop, as a smaller 
number of traffickers would be in demand for their product. 
The problem with this scheme is that the central government does not have the capacity 
to reprimand traffickers who are granted amnesty but nonetheless continue to partake in the 
drug trade. An inability to mete out punitive measures would undermine both the scheme and 
the government’s already shaken credibility in terms of its ability to deal harshly with traffickers 
[60]. Political ruin will also result if amnesty programmes take place at the same time as 
eradication programmes; implementing the two programmes concurrently will ensure that 
individuals who generate large profits receive judicial pardons, while farmers who earn a 
subsistence living from the crop will face potential prosecution and destruction of their income 
[61]. Due to these various drawbacks, amnesty programme are undesirable. 
Alternative development programmes 
Alternative development (AD) programmes aim to reduce drug production by offering 
economic alternatives to a rural population otherwise dependent on cultivating illegal narcotics 
[62]. The scope of programmes currently employed in Afghanistan is wide and varied. ‘Crop 
diversification’ programmes urge farmers to cultivate legal crops such as wheat, potatoes, or 
fruits rather than opium [63]. ‘Cash for work’ programmes offer locals the opportunity to 
partake in wage work on important and necessary projects [64]. ‘Microfinance’ programmes 
offer loans to rural Afghanis, which in turn allow them to escape the cycle of indebtedness 
associated with opium-as-credit loans, and as well allow them to start a new business or buy a 
new type of seed [65]. These programmes are in theory quite efficacious and appropriate for a 
society trying to transition away from a drug economy. However, programmes of this type 
have to date failed somewhat in their mission in Afghanistan. 
Many regions in Afghanistan lack a secure environment, and this insecurity is influential, 
as it makes it more difficult for some AD programmes to succeed. For example, Taliban threats 
ordering farmers to grow opium have undermined ‘crop substitution’ schemes, while insurgent 
attacks on road workers have undermined ‘cash for work’ programmes [66]. Economic issues 
are also influential, as the aid received by AD programmes to date is less than what donors 
initially pledged. When aid does indeed arrive, government and aid agencies that are in charge 
of the programmes oftentimes mismanage it [67]. Political factors, similar to security and 
economic factors, negatively affect AD programmes in Afghanistan. Most notably, the presence 
of politicians who siphon aid money into their personal coffers is negatively influencing the 
programme [68]. Given the lack of security, economic means, and political determination in 
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Afghanistan, there is a need to scale back the goals of AD programmes in the short-term, as the 
present goals are too ambitions for the current environment. 
State building 
In the absence of effective short-term policies for combating the opium problem in 
Afghanistan, there is a need to adopt a comprehensive long-term policy focusing on state 
building [69]. State building is a time consuming process, with multiple steps. Establishing and 
maintaining security, rule of law, and due process in the country is the top priority. Large-scale 
development programmes and public awareness campaigns, which depend on security and rule 
of law, are the next step. The last step involves implementing eradication and interdiction 
programmes. However, these counter-narcotic programmes may only take place after the 
previous steps succeed in their missions. Closer examination of each of these steps will occur 
in the following sections. 
Security, rule of law and due process 
In modern day Afghanistan, a very lawless culture has arisen, and this culture is one of criminal 
impunity. The presence of such a culture influences the illegal opium economy. For example, 
individuals increasingly join the lucrative opium economy due to the knowledge that their 
actions are likely to go unpunished. Other individuals who happily operate outside the 
economy often end up within it, as coercive elements that are unafraid of legal repercussions 
force them to join. What is driving these types of actions, and more generally the culture of 
impunity, is the fact that the central government is unable to assert its sole and sovereign 
authority in all regions of Afghanistan.  
Criminal impunity is rampant in some Afghani regions due to a lack of security. The 
presence of insecurity is partly the fault of international forces, who have been, and continue to 
be, somewhat unsuccessful in their mission to secure Afghanistan [70]. These failures make it 
tougher for the central government to establish its authority, as its personnel and infrastructure 
are constantly under threat of attack. Concomitantly, these failures have led to the emergence 
of ‘shadow governments’ who thrive off the absence of rule of law and due process, and 
therefore promote actions that undermine the central government’s authority. 
Bureaucratic factors as well contribute to the rise of culture of criminal impunity. 
Afghanistan’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda has not yet established strong, effective, 
and accountable institutions and law enforcement agencies that can create and maintain 
security, rule of law, and due process [71]. Reasons for the SSR’s shortcomings include a lack of 
funding, a poor structural organisation, and the presence of deep-rooted corruption [72]. In 
order to rid the country of the culture of criminal impunity, there is a need to strengthen 
foreign and domestic apparatuses so they can better establish security, rule of law, and due 
process.  
Additional foreign troops, as requested by commanders on the ground [73], should deploy 
to Afghanistan to help suppress destabilising forces. As for Afghanistan’s security sector, it 
must become strong, effective, and accountable at a more accelerated pace. To accomplish 
this, a single party such as the UN, the United States, or Afghanistan should assume control of 
the SSR agenda in hopes of implementing a more coherent and balanced strategy than is 
currently in place [74]. Additional aid to augment the relatively low funding enjoyed by the SSR 
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agenda is as well necessary for eliminating some of the ills plaguing the programme [75]. 
Moreover, there is a need to abandon the counter-narcotic pillar due to its capacity to alienate 
vital segments of the population. 
With these modifications in place, the security situation will improve, and apparatuses that 
can maintain security will develop at a more rapid pace. Greater security and stability will 
enable the state to uphold the rule of law and due process more effectively, and the dominance 
of the culture of impunity will decrease. As impunity decreases, participants in the opium 
economy will be more reluctant to participate as the risks of breaking the law and facing 
punishment will be greater. Those who do nonetheless choose to participate will encounter 
legal repercussions at a greater frequency than they do now. The end result will be fewer 
participants, and with fewer participants, the magnitude and severity of the opium problem in 
Afghanistan will decrease.  
Alternative development programmes 
The perceived failure of AD programmes in Afghanistan does not mean that they are inherently 
flawed. In fact, given the right conditions, programmes of this nature have the capacity to 
succeed as part of a long-term process. Success however, depends on satisfying the right 
conditions. Firstly, it is of the utmost importance that local and international forces secure and 
stabilise Afghanistan. Second, donor nations need to deliver on their promises, and hand over 
all previously pledged aid that has yet to arrive in Afghanistan [76]. Lastly, it is necessary to 
strengthen the civil and governmental bodies currently overseeing the programme, as these 
programmes are inefficient and lack in determination. To achieve this, there is a need to 
modify existing bodies or create new bodies such as to rid the programme of corruption and 
mismanagement. These bodies will supervise the programmes, and as well muster support for 
the programmes domestically and around the world. If, and when, these conditions are 
satisfied, alternative development programmes can and should proceed on a large scale. 
Licensing opium 
At present, according to the World Health Organisation, there is a global shortage of opium-
based medicines such as morphine and codeine. The incongruity between the global demand 
and the global supply is especially notable in the developing world [77]. Afghanistan has the 
capacity to bridge this gap between supply and demand, by developing a system of opium 
licensing to complement other AD programmes in the country. Under this system, which has 
received support both from within Afghanistan and from around the world [78], farmers will 
receive a license to grow opium for conversion into legal medicines.  
From an international law viewpoint, this proposal is a viable one for Afghanistan, 
because the country is a signatory to the three UN treaties regulating drug policy. In accordance 
with the treaties, Afghanistan may produce opium for medicinal purposes. Afghanistan may 
also convert the opium into medicine and subsequently export these medicines. In order to 
cultivate, convert, and export opium and its derivative medicines, all that is required is the 
establishment of a national agency to oversee the licensing process [79]. From an agricultural 
viewpoint, this proposal is as well viable for Afghanistan, as evident by the fact that it projects 
to produce over 6,1000 tonnes of opium in 2006 [80]. From a security standpoint, Afghanistan 
is somewhat lacking, as destabilising forces may try to sabotage the programme, and thus it is 
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essential to secure regions where this programme will take place. With security in place and the 
licensing system under way, the desirability of the programme will become evident, as it will 
work to undermine the illicit opium economy [81].  
 The supply of opium diverted to the illegal economy will decrease because farmers will 
likely join the legal opium economy. Incentive for doing so results from the fact that growing 
opium legally allows them to operate within the confines of the law while still earning a 
comparable livelihood [82]. The supply of operatives in the opium economy may as well 
decrease, as some may join the workforce in factories that convert opium to medicines. 
Despite these benefits, the supply of operatives and illicit opium is unlikely to disappear 
completely.  
However, the scale of the entire opium economy will be smaller than it is now, and this is 
preferable in a number of ways. Instead of 100% of Afghani opium reaching the illegal market, 
only some opium will end up there [83]. The smaller scale of the illegal opium economy will as 
well enable Afghani authorities to deal with the opium problem more effectively; a smaller 
illegal drug economy means there are fewer people to incarcerate, fields to eradicate, and 
processing labs to interdict. Afghani institutions and law enforcement agencies will also be 
more effective due to increased funding generated by taxing the legal opium economy [84].  
Education and public awareness 
Many Afghanis view opium in a positive light due to its economic usefulness. In a bid to curb 
the opium economy, there is a need to appeal to the population’s intellect, and educate them 
regarding the negative impact of opium. Enhanced knowledge of this sort may deter Afghanis 
from cultivating, trafficking, and consuming the narcotic. One way of enhancing the 
population’s knowledge is by conducting a public awareness campaign. The scope of 
information encompassed in the public awareness campaign will be broad and comprehensive. 
It will focus on how opium harms the country’s security, its economic growth, and its 
international reputation. The fact that opium is illegal, injurious, and un-Islamic will as well be 
a focal point of the campaign [85]. Government organisations, civil groups, educational 
institutions, and the media will be responsible for disseminating the campaign’s message [86].  
A public awareness campaign of this sort is not a novel idea, as one is currently in place in 
Afghanistan. However, there are some flaws with the current campaign. Primarily, there is a 
problem with hypocrisy: individuals and institutions that publicly educate the masses and 
condemn the narcotic are often complicit in the drug trade. When this occurs, the thrust of the 
message loses some of its strength. To avoid this, there is a need to ensure that all parties 
involved in heightening awareness practice what they preach. One way for making this happen 
is by establishing rule of law and due process, which will minimise the number of people 
involved with the drug, including those who are in charge of delivering the message to the 
masses. Thus, the main difference between this public awareness campaign and the one 
currently taking place in Afghanistan will be the elimination of hypocrisy amongst those 
delivering the message. 
Counter-narcotic operations 
There is a need to suspend all interdiction and eradication programmes, as at present time they 
are inappropriate strategies for Afghanistan. However, programmes of this type should start up 
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again once an appropriate environment manifests. An environment deemed appropriate is one 
that is marked by security, rule of law, due process, and bountiful alterative livelihood options. 
The reasoning for why such an environment is integral for the resumption of interdiction and 
eradication programmes is as follows.  
As counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts reach successful completion, the 
importance of warlords as sources of intelligence will diminish. When this occurs, the issue of 
whether or not interdiction alienates them becomes irrelevant [87]. The presence of many 
alternative livelihood options will deprive farmers of their current rationale for growing opium, 
which focuses on how it is their sole means of earning a living. As a result, crop eradication 
will become less alienating, and opium fields not licensed by the government should and will 
face eradication. 
Conclusion 
The illegal opium economy in Afghanistan is not a recent phenomenon. To date, there has 
been a reliance on traditional approaches to combat the drug problem in the country. This 
must stop. There are no quick and easy solutions. Instead, there are only long and multi-
layered solutions, which need commitment, support, and open-mindedness. The world 
community must understand this, and act upon it. Otherwise, the opium economy will 
continue to dominate in Afghanistan, and insecurity will continue to plague much of the 
international community 
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This article surveys the possible application of International Criminal Law to address abuse of 
power. It thereby aims to stimulate discussion on criminal responsibility for abuse of power. 
Military commanders and civilian superiors, including politicians, can under conditions be held 
liable for abusing their power position in relation to the commitment of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. War crimes require a state of conflict, while crimes against 
humanity and genocide can take place in both times of peace and war. Criminal forms of 
participation include committing and ordering such crimes. The abuse of a position of 
authority can be an aggravating factor in the sentencing. Even if the superior did not get 
involved in the crime directly, command responsibility can be established if the superior did 
not prevent his or her subordinates from committing the crime. It can also be established if the 
superior did not punish these subordinates for committing the crime. Criteria include that the 
commander or superior had effective control over his or her subordinates, whether on a legal 
basis or in fact, and knew or had reason to know that they were committing or about to 
commit such crimes. Therefore, people who abuse their position to, for example, cause or 
maintain a conflict situation at the cost of the human security of population groups, could find 
themselves accused of having committed international crimes. 
 
During my research and interviews in conflict areas in Asia [1], again and again a pattern of 
abuse of power to safeguard interests at the cost of people at grassroots level appeared. One 
interviewee from the Philippines, who witnessed the emotions of both military and rebels, said 
that the war that took place seemed like a game played by ambitious men. Interviews in other 
countries also referred to interests of people far away from the conflict area and personally 
unaffected by the consequences of armed conflict. Interests in natural resources such as gas 
and wood were referred to as root causes to the conflict. 
Based on reoccurring patterns, including those in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it 
can be argued that (armed) conflicts at grassroots level often serve certain interests of people in 
power positions. Such conflicts can threaten the security of large groups of the population. 
International criminal tribunals focus their efforts on people in high positions as the people 
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with the greatest responsibility for the conflict. In its Policy Paper, the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court states [2]: 
 
The Office will function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity. On the one 
hand it will initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the 
crimes. On the other hand it will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for 
the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with the international community to ensure 
that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means. 
 
This paper surveys the possible application of International Criminal Law to address abuse 
of power. It thereby aims to stimulate discussion on criminal responsibility for abuse of power. 
First, underlying interests in conflicts are touched upon. Second, international criminal law is 
introduced. Third, international crimes are elaborated upon. Fourth, individual criminal 
responsibility is discussed with a focus on command or superior responsibility. 
 Interests in conflict 
Taking a look at the world map, there is a striking overlap between the location of natural 
resources, conflicts and human rights violations. The presence of big (international) companies 
is also noticeable in these areas. Our current consumption patterns result in transport of 
resources and products all over the world. The huge amount of trade and finances involved 
increase the stake for multinationals in access to resources and interests of States in 
exploitation of resources for export. Another big business at a global scale is the weapon 
industry, entailing high financial interests in (potential) conflict. 
As an example, part of the conflict in Aceh concerns the wish for independence, often 
related to the call for an Islamic state. This fuels the fear of many Indonesians to loose 
(another) part of the country’s territory. However, the main interests behind the conflict seem 
to be economic interests in natural resources such as gas and wood, influencing politics and 
social aspects. A comparative analysis on the atrocities against women of Aceh, East-Timor, 
Papua, and Jakarta reveals many similarities in the violence. Another reoccurring pattern 
appears to entail the soothing of a population by, for example, taking measures that underline 
their identity in response to unrest. For example, Islamic law might be granted to a certain 
extent, such as relating to the use of alcohol, but at the same time human rights and control 
over resources may be withheld. Similarly, in distracting the attention of people, measures 
claimed to be based on Christian values may actually serve expansion of access to resources. [3] 
Raising or maintaining conflict, both abroad and internal, can form a distraction from 
other issues and interests. As stated by one of the interviewees, during a status of red alert 
another year of Martial Law can easily be provoked. When it was voiced that it was time to end 
the military status in this region, ‘suddenly’ a big accident happened that provided the 
authorities with an excuse to extend the military regime. In this case, the military interest was 
directly connected to the presence of an international oil company, which had to pay a high 
price for their security considering the conflict. In addition, it is noticeable that when peace is 
established in one conflict area, often escalation takes place in another area. 
 The diversity in society – ethnic, religious and cultural – is regularly abused to 
provoke hatred between population groups. To start or maintain an armed conflict, use of the 
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‘divide-and-rule’ strategy appears to have remained popular. By dividing the population, for 
example, (over-)exploitation of resources and confiscation of land can take place without too 
much consequence. Historical and present misunderstandings enable such strategies. Cases 
include situations in which members of one ethnic group were killed while rumours were 
spread that another ethnic group is responsible. Research also reveals a pattern in which, just 
before armed conflict takes place, groups of outsiders enter the area to stimulate polarisation 
and disturb existing good relations. For example, in the Philippines (Christian) militias 
instigated by outsiders attacked the Moro (Muslim) population at the start of the armed 
conflict in Mindanao in 1972. Minorities can serve as scapegoats, such as the Chinese 
population in Indonesia, who were the main victim of the 1998 Jakarta rapes during the 
downfall of Soeharto. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda played the ethnic 
card. According to the Vasiljevic Trial Judgment: ‘During the Bosnian conflict, ethnicity has 
variedly been exploited to gain political prominence or to retain power, to justify criminal 
deeds, or for the purpose of obtaining moral absolution for any act coloured by the ethnic 
cause’ [4]. 
International Criminal Law 
International Criminal Law (ICL) is part of international public law [5]. International 
humanitarian law that has become part of customary international law includes the law 
embodied in the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal of 8 august 1945; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for 
the Protection of War Victims. 
Historically, humanitarian law would address the law of war between States. The laws and 
customs of war entailed a code of military conduct between combatant States. However, a shift 
has taken place toward a humanitarian-oriented view. On the state-oriented and human-
oriented approaches Sands states (although not on the law of war as such) [6]:  
 
The judgement of the House of Lords (a national court) in Pinochet and of the ICJ in 
Yerodia reflect, in my opinion, a struggle between two competing visions of 
international law. For the majority in the House of Lords, international law is treated 
as a set of rules the primary purpose of which is to give effect to a set of broadly 
shared values, including a commitment to rooting out impunity for the gravest 
international crimes. The other vision, that reflected in the judgement of the ICJ, sees 
the rules of international law as being intended principally to facilitate relations 
between states, which remain the principal international actors. 
 
The international criminal tribunals seem to be more in line with the focus on ‘rooting out 
impunity for the gravest international crimes’. The Charters and trials of the International 
Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo following the end of World War II lay the 
foundation of individual responsibility under international law, referring to crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity [7]. According to the IMT in Nuremberg: 
‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
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punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced’ [8]. 
Between the end of World War II and the 1990s, the establishment of an international 
criminal tribunal was often regarded as unrealistic. In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as a 
measure to maintain and restore international peace and security, and based on a UN Security 
Council Resolution [9]. In 1994, the UNSC adopted a resolution to establish the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) [10]. The ICTY and ICTR have turned dormant 
humanitarian law into a practical and speedily developing body of law. 
Contrary to the ICTY and ICTR, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent 
court and established by treaty: the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that 
entered into force on 1 July 2002 and to which currently 108 countries are States Parties [11]. 
Another difference between the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals can be found in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, which provides that it will only take up cases not (adequately) dealt with by 
national courts. The ICC has unsealed its first warrants in October 2005. The first person was 
surrendered to the Court in March 2006: Mr. Lubanga, a former leader of a militia group in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, who has been charged with enlisting and conscripting 
children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities. 'The ICC 
continues its investigations of the situations in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, 
Central African Republic and Darfur, the Sudan [12].  
Internationalised criminal courts were also established for Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Kosovo and Cambodia [13]. As stated by the ICC: ‘The Court and the United Nations are each 
part of an emerging system of international criminal justice. Within that system, the staff and 
officials of the different courts and tribunals regularly meet to share lessons from their 
experiences’ [14]. With the coming into existence of the tribunals, ICL has become a far more 
realistic instrument to address international crimes and to prosecute the people responsible. As 
formulated by Mettraux, the following purposes of sentencing individuals for international 
crimes can be identified from the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR [15]:  
 
(i) retribution, described as punishment of an offender for his specific criminal 
conduct; and (ii) general deterrence, understood as deterrence of future violations of 
international humanitarian law. In addition to the two principal purposes of 
sentencing mentioned above, a number of Chambers of the Tribunals have insisted 
that a sentence should also serve other purposes such as ‘individual and affirmative 
prosecution aimed at influencing the legal awareness of the accused, the victims, the 
relatives, the witnesses, and the general public in order to reassure them that the legal 
system is being implemented and enforced’, the ‘protection of society, stigmatisation 
and public reprobation of international crimes’, the ‘rehabilitation’ of the perpetrator, 
or even ‘reconciliation’. 
 
The law that tribunals can apply depends on both international law and on their Statute. 
For example, crimes against humanity do not as such require a state of armed conflict, but the 
Statute adds this requirement for the ICTY. On the applicable law, Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute for the ICC states: 
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1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are 
not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognised norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognised human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
 
According to Kor: ‘[A]s it stands now, we must not see ICL as an autonomous and closed 
‘system’ but as a ‘multipolar space’, open to interactions between general international law and 
international human rights law, and between international and national sources’ [16]. 
International crimes 
International crimes under ICL include war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. A 
shift toward a humanitarian approach also explains the currently fading difference between the 
applicable law, and the international crimes it entails, relating to international and internal 
conflicts. On the distinction between international and internal armed conflicts, the Tadić 
Appeal Chamber stated: ‘that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate 
wars and civil wars is losing its value’ and ‘if international law, while of course duly 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human 
beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight’ 
[17]. For now, the distinction between international and internal armed conflict to a certain 
extent remains to determine the applicable body of law. ‘Grave breaches’ of the Geneva 
Conventions require the involvement of the armed forces of two states in combat, even if only 
on the territory of one state or with minimum intensity. These and other war crimes will be 
discussed first. 
War crimes 
War crimes are serious violations of the laws or customs of war. War crimes can only take 
place during a state of conflict. To constitute a war crime, a crime must have been closely 
related to the hostilities. War crimes can be committed by and against civilians and military. 
Originally, war crimes could not be committed against a state’s own nationals. The Tadić 
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Appeals Chamber stated that actual allegiance and ethnicity can be determinative of 
‘nationality’ for the purpose of the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions, more so 
than formal bonds such as a passport [18].  
War crimes include ‘grave breaches’ of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which require an 
international armed conflict and are limited to certain categories of protected persons and 
properties. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as laid down in Article 2 ICTY Statute 
are: wilful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly; compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; 
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; and taking civilians as hostages. 
Other serious violations of the laws or customs of war as laid down in Article 3 ICTY 
Statute include, but are not limited to: employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of 
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; seizure of, destruction or willful damage 
done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic 
monuments and works of art and science; plunder of public or private property. 
Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity can be committed both in times of war and peace. Crimes against 
humanity refer to inhumane acts such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. These crimes can only be 
committed against civilians. 
Crimes against humanity chapeau elements are: 1. an attack (commission of acts of 
violence); 2. nexus between acts and attack; 3. the attack is directed against any civilian 
population; 4. the attack is widespread or systematic; 5. the perpetrator must know that his acts 
are part of an attack on the civilian population. Crimes against humanity as laid down in Article 
5 of the ICTY Statute and Article 3 of the ICTR Statute are: murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial and religious ground; 
and other inhumane acts. 
Genocide 
The crime of genocide mainly resulted from the atrocities of World War II. This crime does 
not require a state of conflict. Genocide can be committed by and against civilians and military. 
Genocide contains acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, e.g. by killing members of the group and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.  
The chapeau elements of genocide are: 1. intent; 2. to destroy; 3. in whole or in part; 4. a 
protected group; 5. as such. Genocide requires a special or genocidal intent to destroy a 
protected group in whole or in part. Underlying offences are: killing members of the group; 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
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imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children 
of the group to another group. Criminal participation in genocide refers to: committing 
genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
attempt to commit genocide; complicity in genocide. 
Individual criminal responsibility 
The crimes as laid out above entail individual responsibility. Article 7 ICTY Statute on 
individual criminal responsibility, similar to Article 6 ICTR Statute, states [19]:  
 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 
5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or 
of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires. 
 
The reference to Articles 2-5 concerns: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (Article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and 
crimes against humanity (Article 5). 
Forms of participation 
Article 7(1) ICTY Statute entails the various forms of participation. For example, publications 
that encourage ICL crimes can under circumstances result in instigation. The ICTR in the 
Nahimana Trial Judgment states [20]: 
 
977A. As founder, owner and editor of Kangura, a publication that instigated the 
killing of Tutsi civilians, and for his individual acts in ordering and aiding and abetting 
the killing of Tutsi civilians, the Chamber finds Hassan Ngeze guilty of genocide, 
pursuant to Article 6(1) of its Statute. 
 
The various forms of participation included in Article 6(1) ICTR Statute are explained in 
the Semanza Trial Judgement as follows [21]:  
 
(i) Planning 
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380. “Planning” envisions one or more persons formulating a method of design or 
action, procedure, or arrangement for the accomplishment of a particular crime. The 
level of participation in the planning must be substantial such as actually formulating 
the criminal plan or endorsing a plan proposed by another. 
(ii)  Instigating 
381. “Instigating” refers to urging, encouraging, or prompting another person to 
commit a crime. Instigation need not be direct and public. Proof is required of a 
causal connection between the instigation and the commission of the crime. 
(iii) Ordering 
382. “Ordering” refers to a situation where an individual has a position of authority 
and uses that authority to order – and thus compel – another individual, who is 
subject to that authority, to commit a crime. Criminal responsibility for ordering the 
commission of a crime under the Statute implies the existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship between the individual who gives the order and the one who 
executes it.  
(iv) Committing 
383. “Committing” refers to the direct personal or physical participation of an 
accused in the actual acts which constitute the material elements of a crime under the 
Statute. 
(v) Aiding and Abetting in the Planning, Preparation, or Execution 
384. The terms “aiding” and “abetting” refer to distinct legal concepts. The term 
“aiding” means assisting or helping another to commit a crime, and the term 
“abetting” means encouraging, advising, or instigating the commission of a crime. 
However, the terms “aiding” and “abetting” are frequently employed together as a 
single broad legal concept, as is the case in this Tribunal. 
Command responsibility 
People in power positions often do not personally commit the crimes but enable or allow 
others to commit them. Command responsibility as formulated in Article 7(3) ICTY Statute can 
under conditions address their (lack of) actions in such cases. The shared Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY and ICTR states on command responsibility [22]:  
 
Thus, whether Article 3 of the Statute is referring to war crimes committed in the 
course of international armed conflict or to war crimes committed in the course of 
internal armed conflict under Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, it 
assumes that there is an organized military force. It is evident that there cannot be an 
organized military force save on the basis of responsible command. It is also 
reasonable to hold that it is responsible command which leads to command 
responsibility. Command responsibility is the most effective method by which 
international criminal law can enforce responsible command.  
 
Criminal responsibility of a superior or commander relates to his/her own acts or failures 
to act to prevent or punish the acts of others. The criteria for establishing command 
responsibility are summarised by Mettraux as follows [23]:  
 International criminal responsibility for abuse of power?              23 
 
 
 
 
(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander or 
superior and the alleged principal offenders; 
(ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so; and 
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such 
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
 
Jurisprudence reaffirms that command responsibility can be established for both military 
and civil superiors, including politicians. In the Čelebići case, the Appeals Chamber elaborated 
on the application of command responsibility to civilian superiors, and reaffirmed that such 
responsibility can relate to both de jure and de facto command or control [24].  
 
195. The Trial Chamber, prior to making this statement in relation to the case of 
Mucic, had already considered the origin and meaning of de facto authority with 
reference to existing practice. Based on an analysis of World War II jurisprudence, 
the Trial Chamber also concluded that the principle of superior responsibility 
reflected in Article 7(3) of the Statute encompasses political leaders and other civilian 
superiors in positions of authority. The Appeals Chamber finds no reason to disagree 
with the Trial Chamber’s analysis of this jurisprudence. The principle that military and 
other superiors may be held criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates is 
well-established in conventional and customary law. The standard of control reflected 
in Article 87(3) of Additional Protocol I [to the 1949 Geneva Conventions] may be 
considered as customary in nature. In relying upon the wording of Articles 86 and 87 
of Additional Protocol I to conclude that “it is clear that the term ‘superior’ is 
sufficiently broad to encompass a position of authority based on the existence of de 
facto powers of control”, the Trial Chamber properly considered the issue in finding 
the applicable law.  
 
196. “Command”, a term which does not seem to present particular controversy in 
interpretation, normally means powers that attach to a military superior, whilst the 
term “control”, which has a wider meaning, may encompass powers wielded by 
civilian leaders. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the rule 
is controversial that civilian leaders may incur responsibility in relation to acts 
committed by their subordinates or other persons under their effective control. 
Effective control has been accepted, including in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, as 
a standard for the purposes of determining superior responsibility. The Blaskic Trial 
Chamber for instance endorsed the finding of the Trial Judgement to this effect. The 
showing of effective control is required in cases involving both de jure and de facto 
superiors. This standard has more recently been reaffirmed in the ICC Statute, Article 
28 of which reads in relevant parts:  
 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court;  
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(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, . . .  
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph 
(a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as 
a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates . . . 
 
Therefore, command or superior responsibility requires establishment of effective (de jure 
or de facto) control of a (military or civilian) superior to prevent and/or punish a war crime, 
crime against humanity or genocide (to be) committed by subordinates. 
While effective control may be presumed in case of de jure control, the ability to exercise 
effective control is required for the establishment of de facto command or superior 
responsibility [25]. Command responsibility can be established for more than one person, as 
stated in the Krnojelac Trial Judgment [26]:  
 
Effective control means the material ability to prevent offences or punish the 
principal offenders. Where a superior has effective control and fails to exercise that 
power he will be responsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates. Two or 
more superiors may be held responsible for the same crime perpetrated by the same 
individual if it is established that the principal offender was under the command of 
both superiors at the relevant time. 
 
On superior responsibility relating to a leader of a political party, the ICTR in the Nahimana 
Trial Judgment states [27]: 
 
976. The Chamber notes that in Musema, the Tribunal found that superior 
responsibility extended to non-military settings, in that case to the owner of a tea 
factory. The Chamber has considered the extent to which Barayagwiza, as leader of the 
CDR, a political party, can be held responsible pursuant to Article 6(3) of its Statute 
for acts committed by CDR party members and Impuzamugambi. The Chamber 
recognizes that a political party and its leadership cannot be held accountable for all 
acts committed by party members or others affiliated to the party. A political party is 
unlike a government, military or corporate structure in that its members are not 
bound through professional affiliation or in an employment capacity to be governed 
by the decision-making body of the party. Nevertheless, the Chamber considers that 
to the extent that members of a political party act in accordance with the dictates or 
instruction of that party, or otherwise under its instruction, those issuing such dictates 
or instruction can and should be held accountable for their implementation. In this 
case, CDR party members and Impuzamugambi were following the lead of the party, and 
of Barayagwiza himself, who was at meetings, at demonstrations, and at road-blocks, 
where CDR members and Impuzqmugambi were marshalled into action by party 
officials, including Barayagwiza or under his authority as leader of the party. In these 
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circumstances, the Chamber holds that Barayagwiza was responsible for the activities 
of CDR members and Impuzamugambi, to the extent that such activities were initiated 
by or undertaken in accordance with his direction as leader of the CDR party. 
 
977. The Chamber finds that Barayagwiza had superior responsibility over members of 
the CDR and its militia, the Impuzamugambi, as President of CDR at Gisenyi Prefecture 
and from February 1994 as President of CDR at the national level. He promoted the 
policy of CDR for the extermination of the Tutsi population and supervised his 
subordinates, the CDR members and Impuzamugambi militia, in carrying out the killings 
and other violent acts. For his active engagement in CDR, and his failure to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the killing of Tutsi civilians by CDR 
members and Impuzamugambi, the Chamber finds Barayagwiza guilty of genocide 
pursuant to Article 6(3) of its Statute. 
 
That a superior ‘knew’ or ‘had reason to know’ needs to be established beyond reasonable 
doubt. The Čelebići Appeal Judgment refers to the Trial Chamber’s statement in stating that a 
superior [28]:  
 
may possess the mens rea for command responsibility where: (1) he had actual 
knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his 
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes referred to under Articles 2 
through 5 of the Statute, or (2) where he had in his possession information of a 
nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by 
indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such 
crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates.  
 
Indicators of such knowledge include the number and type of troops allegedly involved 
and the nature and scope of the responsibility of the accused and his position in the hierarchy 
[29]. Punishment by the superior of his or her subordinates does not obsolete the duty to 
prevent their acts; the requirements to prevent and punish are cumulative. 
The abuse of a position of authority can also constitute an aggravating circumstance in 
sentencing. According to Mettraux: ‘An individual will not be sentenced more harshly simply 
because he finds himself higher up in the hierarchy, but his sentence may be aggravated if he 
has abused or wrongly exercised the powers and responsibilities placed upon him for the 
purpose of committing or facilitating crimes’ [30]. In case an accused has been found guilty for 
both taking part in the commission of a crime and for failing to prevent the acts or punish the 
perpetrators, the Blaškić Appeal Judgment stated that the conviction will be based on the 
commitment of the crime while considering the superior position of the accused as an 
aggravating factor in sentencing [31]. 
Conclusion 
Military commanders and civilian superiors, including politicians, can under conditions be held 
liable for abusing their power position in relation to the commitment of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. War crimes require a state of conflict, while crimes against 
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humanity and genocide can take place in both times of peace and war. Criminal forms of 
participation include committing and ordering such crimes. The abuse of a position of 
authority can be an aggravating factor in the sentencing. Even if the superior did not get 
involved in the crime directly, command responsibility can be established if the superior did 
not prevent his or her subordinates from committing the crime. It can also be established if the 
superior did not punish these subordinates for committing the crime. Criteria include that the 
commander or superior had effective control over his or her subordinates, whether on a legal 
basis or in fact, and knew or had reason to know that they were committing or about to 
commit such crimes. Command responsibility may be hard to prove, although the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR has shown that the judges will not be easily distracted by 
legalities such as a de jure command or control. 
Therefore, people who abuse their position to, for example, cause or maintain a conflict 
situation at the cost of the human security of population groups, could find themselves 
accused of having committed international crimes. For example, abusing ones power position 
to order or allow people to be tortured, disappeared or killed during an armed conflict is likely 
to constitute a war crime. Instigating the prosecution of members of a certain population 
group as part of a widespread or systematic attack to safeguard land interests could very well 
constitute a crime against humanity. 
Considering the development of ICL and the more than one hundred States Parties to the 
ICC, international criminal responsibility has become a suitable instrument to address and 
discourage certain forms of abuse of power, which can include power abused to serve interests 
such as in natural resources. The cooperation of States and international organisations is e.g. 
needed to arrest and transfer accused to international criminal tribunals, and to enable the 
gathering of evidence. Prosecution of crimes is one of many instruments to address injustice 
and human insecurity. The media and academic writing can, for example, assist in increasingly 
providing people with information that exposes the root causes of conflict and international 
crimes. In addition, positive measures such as peace-building efforts undertaken at the 
grassroots level can contribute to an environment in which people are less vulnerable to 
manipulation. 
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In this paper we explore the role of scientific and technical education in addressing security 
issues on the African continent. We adopt a definition of “security” that emphasises the well-
being of the citizen rather than that of the state, and that encompasses both military and non-
military threats. Security and development are interlinked, and this paper will emphasise the 
need for an effective African technical infrastructure to address these twin issues. To this end, 
we argue for the establishment of a pan-African network of mathematical institutes, relying on 
open-source software and educational tools as well as improved communication links 
throughout the continent. We emphasise the crucial role played by free and open-source tools 
in improving communication links on the continent. As a case study, we analyse the recently 
founded African Institute for Mathematical Sciences in South Africa. This unique project is 
characterised by three main characteristics: a commitment to pan-African cooperation, 
innovative, project-based teaching methods, and exclusive reliance on open-source software 
and educational material. We analyse to what extent it can serve as a model for future 
capacity building initiatives. Finally, we outline the proposed African Mathematical Institute 
Network, or AMI-Net. This network of interconnected institutes will help to build the scientific 
and technical knowledge base necessary for sustained African development. We offer 
suggestions for the implementation of the project, and show how it can contribute to the 
overall security infrastructure. 
 
It is hardly a matter of controversy that many African countries have failed to capitalise on 
their enormous potential in the years since independence. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, 
suffers the highest infant mortality, the highest AIDS incidence, and the severest poverty-related 
issues of any region in the world. Northern Africa, as well, is plagued by corruption, repressive 
government, and internal conflict. Therefore, the “Africa” we refer to encompasses the whole 
continent, not simply the area south of the Sahara. The countries of the region are linked 
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together by history and by the problems of the present day; it therefore makes sense that 
security policy for the region must address cross-continental issues.  
Issues of security and development are intertwined, and it is often difficult to define them 
separately. Threats to security do not necessarily take a military form; AIDS, malaria, inadequate 
sanitation, poor access to education, and economic exclusion would be high on anyone’s list of 
Africa’s woes. Poverty has a destabilising effect, and scarce resources inevitably lead to conflict. 
In this paper we define “security” to mean a guarantee of protection from both internal and 
external threats. Citizens are not secure when states go to war; nor are they secure when 
diseases ravage their villages or when they are denied access to a livelihood. We see a secure 
continent as the responsibility of governments and of individuals, and envisage economic 
development and a higher regional standard of living as important steps toward achieving this 
goal.  
The response to these security issues must necessarily be multi-faceted. The problems 
facing Africa are large and complex; no single solution will be adequate for the entire 
population. However, small, focussed projects can have a significant impact. In this paper we 
will discuss one such project and how it fits into the development picture. First, we will 
provide a brief overview of the major security threats facing the continent and show how 
progress in combating them may be made by an educated, well-trained science and technology 
workforce. Second, we will illustrate a successful example of capacity building in the 
mathematical sciences and technology, and finally we will discuss how it may be extended to 
serve a larger segment of the population. While science education cannot alone solve the 
continent’s problems, it can help to empower those most qualified to find the solutions. For 
that alone, we believe it is worthy of significant, directed investment. 
Threats to Security  
Historically, African states have faced a range of security issues since independence. 
Competition over resource-rich areas like the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Nigerian oilfields has been intense, leading to conflicts that wreaked havoc in the newly created 
states and continue to simmer in the present day. These conflicts have transcended the 
boundaries drawn by the colonial powers, involving a range of nation-states and ethnic groups. 
Additionally, these arbitrary boundaries have contributed to internecine conflicts between 
ethnic and cultural groups, culminating most famously in the Rwandan genocide and the 
Biafran civil war. Matters have not been helped by incompetent or corrupt local governments 
too frequently characterised by “Big Men”-tyrants like Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko and Uganda’s 
Idi Amin [3]. Present-day Africa has inherited the aftermath of these troubles, and must bear 
the additional burden of competition in an increasingly globalised world.  
Conflicts over resources are enhanced by poor or unsustainable management of the 
environment coupled with the effects of global climate change. Particularly in northern Africa, 
climate change and ecosystem degradation pose serious threats to regional security. 
Desertification and poor management of dry-land ecosystems affect approximately two billion 
people worldwide. Overgrazing and pollution of scarce water supplies pose a serious problem 
for the large proportion of desert dwellers living in poverty, and migration of populations from 
degraded areas can exacerbate political or ethnic conflict, as in the Darfur province of Sudan 
[4]. With the loss of dry-land biodiversity comes the loss of indigenous knowledge, as local 
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plants and animals used in traditional healing and industry become rare or extinct. Additionally, 
food stocks may be catastrophically reduced as land suitable for livestock grazing and food 
production is depleted. It is estimated that 20 percent of dry-land in this region is degraded 
every year, a figure that is increasing with time. Researchers believe that such land can be 
restored to 50-75 percent of its previous productivity [5], but the support for locally-based 
research and implementation is virtually nonexistent. While hardly a panacea, reclamation of 
this depleted land can help to alleviate the security situation in the region.  
Recently, reporting on resource-based conflicts on the African continent has been 
displaced in the Western media by a new focus on global health. Bolstered by donations from 
two of the world’s richest men, Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, NGOs and public health 
professionals have led a new battle to eradicate deadly diseases. It is certainly true that AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases have enormously devastating effects for individuals, and that 
massive intervention is needed to prevent the destabilisation of societies. However, as a recent 
article in Science points out, “there is no architecture for global health” [2]. Competition and 
poor communication between drug and vaccine distribution agencies means that often goals 
are not met. The lack of epidemiological models and on-the-ground data coupled with poor 
technological infrastructure mean that medical help often fails to reach those who need it 
most. The lack of well-equipped African research facilities and trained personnel leads to over-
reliance on Western expertise and aid. American and European pharmaceutical companies 
focus on the diseases that affect those populations, often neglecting the diseases rampant on 
the African continent. Similarly, reliance on Western public health officials prevents African 
governments from setting their own priorities for treatment and vaccination. It is not 
surprising that this approach leads to deep distrust of imported medications. Unless indigenous 
research and development are supported, calls to boycott the polio vaccine and to replace anti-
retroviral drugs with potatoes and garlic will gain more credence.  
The lack of a communications infrastructure on much of the continent serves to further 
hinder treatment and prevention efforts. In fact, poor connections between different areas 
have destabilised individual countries and entire regions. With the exception of artificial, 
Western-mediated coalitions designed to enforce Cold War spheres of influence, the history of 
modern Africa has been one of conflict rather than cooperation. Put simply, circumstances 
have made it impossible for some groups to communicate with others. Transport links and 
roads between neighbouring countries are often degraded or nonexistent, and some rural areas 
lack any transport infrastructure at all, particularly in inclement weather. Virtual 
communication, as well, is often difficult or impossible. Internet bandwidth costs are 
prohibitively high, sometimes exceeding comparable services in the USA by a factor of ten [6]. 
Landline phones are poorly served, and mobile technology, while rapidly embraced by the 
public, still has not penetrated many rural areas. Even when computers have been brought into 
schools, the staff has rarely received the training necessary to make effective use of them in 
their lesson plans. In some cases computer labs sit unused or are sold for scrap metal. The 
shortage of computer scientists, as with the shortage of transport engineers, logistics experts, 
and telecommunications engineers severely hampers the communication situation on the 
continent. This, in turn, exacerbates cultural differences, hampers trade efforts, and poses a 
low-level but long-term threat to security.  
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It is clear that the lack of trained and well-equipped African staff severely hampers 
development efforts on the continent. Many of the developing world’s problems demand 
innovative solutions which cannot be imposed from outside. We argue that any serious 
attempt to improve the security situation must focus both on developing this knowledge base 
and on fostering cooperation between disparate groups. Science, by its very nature, tends to 
foster collaborations and improve links between nations and cultures. In the following sections 
we will discuss the role of science and technology in development, and outline specific 
measures that can be taken. 
Role of science and technology in development  
Obviously, a stable and secure African continent requires good governance, fair trading 
policies, strong economic leadership, and improved relations between different ethnic and 
cultural groups. No single policy or donation can improve the security situation and promote 
sustainable development. However, science and technology underpin industrialisation and 
informed policy choices. An educated workforce coupled with a stable job sector can promote 
the development and opportunity so crucial to regional security. Technical knowledge builds 
roads and computer networks; it coordinates effective aid efforts and develops economic 
policy. While not a panacea, scientific and technical education can help to build the framework 
necessary for development and security.  
We cannot stress enough that such expertise must be local and sustainable. Reliance on 
outside experts often leads to inappropriate development or waste of precious funds. Often 
development projects mediated by westerners take the form of prestige projects-the under-
used international airports in Maseru and Lubumbashi, for example, or the hydroelectric dams 
built in Ghana. Additionally, aid workers ignorant of local customs may direct efforts and 
funding toward well-intentioned yet inappropriate projects, such as unread surveys of local 
wildlife. Finally, without a strong coordinating local presence, aid projects may seem arbitrary 
and scattershot, as with shipments of stiletto heels and American football equipment to 
refugee camps in southern Sudan. A highly trained local presence will help to ensure that 
foreign development aid maximises its effectiveness.  
The importance of science and technology cuts across political and cultural borders, and is 
recognised at the highest levels of government. In July 2001, the African Union (formerly the 
Organization of African Unity) adopted a strategic framework for the development of the 
entire continent. The New Project for Africa’s Development, or NEPAD, seeks to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals through continent-wide cooperation [9]. NEPAD stresses the 
importance of science and technology, and has identified five main platforms, which are:  
1. Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Indigenous Knowledge  
2. Energy, Water and Desertification  
3. Material Sciences, Manufacturing, Laser and Post-Harvest Technologies  
4. Information, Communication and Space Science Technologies  
5. Mathematical Sciences  
The presence of the Mathematical Science platform is intended to strengthen the other 
areas of focus. Mathematics is the language of all science; modern technologies universally rely 
on algorithms and methods developed by mathematicians. Mathematical knowledge allows 
scientists to analyse data and to develop theories that predict future events. Capacity building 
 African Institutes for Mathematical Sciences              33 
 
 
 
in mathematics and science is therefore crucial to achieving security, stability and development 
on the continent.  
We argue that specific steps can be taken to create a pan-African science infrastructure, 
based on the mathematical sciences, in order to address these security threats and mediate 
responsible development. In particular, we fully support the creation of a network of institutes 
characterised by an innovative teaching style, the use of free and open-source software tools, 
and a focus on pan-African collaboration. In the following sections we will discuss the 
implementation of such a network, and show its benefits for the African continent. 
Current state of technical education  
Even the richest Western universities struggle to balance their need to support useful research 
with their obligations to educate their students. Many African universities face the additional 
obstacles of war, instability, corruption, and under-funding. In recent years, the University of 
Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been forced to shut down, sometimes for 
periods of up to one year. A former lecturer at a university in Angola observed, “I would have 
loved to keep teaching. But after a year of not being paid anything I had to take another job to 
support my family”. The cost of internet bandwidth is often ten times what it would be in the 
United States. Lack of interest and enthusiasm from students is not often an issue– it is 
estimated that staff numbers in Nigerian universities must increase by fifty percent in order to 
keep pace with swelling enrolment [6]. However, the pool of suitable lecturers and funds 
available to pay them has not grown at a commensurate rate.  
Students we interviewed often criticized the rigid, “Victorian” teaching styles employed at 
many schools, colleges, and universities on the continent. “We were never allowed to ask 
questions,” observed one Nigerian student. A Congolese student said, “we just wrote down 
what the lecturer said and then memorised it.” The lack of resources, poor salaries, and 
inadequate training opportunities make university lecturing and research an unappealing 
prospect for many, and those that do choose to teach find themselves struggling with overlarge 
classes and poor equipment. The environment at many educational institutions does not seem 
to encourage questions, individual training, and creative thought-essential qualities for scientific 
researchers.  
Additionally, unpaid salaries and the lack of security in many countries have contributed to 
a “brain drain”, with many bright African scientists, mathematicians, and health professionals 
choosing to work abroad. While initially devastating for the countries left behind, this mass 
migration creates a prosperous, educated diaspora and a potential pool of trained professionals 
to draw upon for development purposes. The creation of a stable job sector and outlets for 
technical expertise on the continent could effectively tap this human resource, luring many 
professionals home. However, until there is a stable knowledge base and a sustainable 
education infrastructure, this return will remain a pipe dream.  
AIMS  
The African Institute for Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) was founded in 2003 to address these 
issues. Located in Muizenberg, Cape Town, South Africa, AIMS attracts postgraduate students 
from all over the continent. In its first year of operation, 2003-4, 30 students from 11 African 
countries graduated from AIMS. In 2005 41 students from 16 different countries graduated 
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from the program, and last year AIMS graduated 44 students from 18 countries [8]. The number 
of women students continues to increase each year, from just 6 in 2004 to 15 this academic 
year. Students leave AIMS with superb preparation for further study or employment in the 
quantitative sciences. However, each AIMS alumnus we interviewed cited the friendships and 
scientific collaborations they made with students and faculty as the high point of the 
experience. As one student said, “we were taught all Muslims were suicide bombers. Now I can 
say Muslims from Sudan, Egypt, and Kenya are my best friends”. The intensity of the course 
coupled with its success at attracting the brightest mathematics students on the continent helps 
to build the networks which will allow African science to thrive in the future.  
Facilities and Physical Plant  
The AIMS building is a former hotel located in Muizenberg, a sleepy suburb of Cape Town. On 
the ground floor is a communal dining hall and large lecture theater. Students and teaching 
staff live in rooms on the top floors, fostering an extraordinarily open environment in which 
lecturer-student interactions are frequent, even late at night and early in the morning. 
Additionally, students may access a well-stocked library and computer lab on the first floor.  
Numerous AIMS alumni cited the facilities as the best aspect of AIMS after the friendships 
and collaborations developed. The AIMS computer lab boasts state-of-the-art PCs and a 
broadband internet connection, allowing students access to a number of online journals, 
educational sites, and other resources. Most importantly, from the first day of instruction 
students are immersed in free and open-source software, which we will later argue is crucial to 
the technological development of Africa as a whole. 
The AIMS Course  
The year is divided into three parts. Initially, the emphasis is on fundamental problem-solving 
techniques. Students receive preliminary training in approximation and estimation techniques 
as well as an introduction to the structure of mathematical proof. These courses, in addition to 
providing an open environment for learning, allow students to experience methods of teaching 
which may differ drastically from traditional recitation-based lecture courses. Students work in 
groups on complex problems such as estimating the deflection of light by the sun due to 
general relativity or on working out proofs crucial to branches of mathematics as disparate as 
geometry and probability theory. During the subsequent “skills semester”, students are 
required to follow a series of three-week courses which run in parallel. These include core skills 
such as programming in Python or C, basic mathematical methods, probability and differential 
equations as applied to epidemiology. No traditional exams are set; instead, students work on a 
variety of challenging problems. By the end of the third month of the course, students who 
may have never seen a computer before can write data-compressing code and solve complex 
equations numerically. Additionally, group work builds trust and collaborations between 
students of different nationalities naturally form.  
The second semester allows students to choose areas of specialisation or to explore more 
branches of the mathematical sciences. Around twenty courses are offered, of which students 
can choose at minimum eight. These include pure mathematics such as topology and group 
theory, fluid dynamics, quantum physics, financial mathematics, applications to biological 
sciences, and further work in computer science and programming. Again, lecturers are 
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encouraged to assess students through projects and challenging assignments rather than 
through traditional written examinations.  
The final third of the year is devoted to individual essays, supervised by faculty members 
at one of the three local universities or by volunteers from as far away as Oxford. Students 
write an essay of thirty to fifty pages, in English, on a mathematical topic proposed by a 
supervisor. While original research content is not necessarily expected, some students’ essays 
have become the basis of masters and doctoral dissertations. Often the essays involve a large 
amount of programming or software development, allowing students an opportunity to apply 
skills learned throughout the year. At the bare minimum, each report must be submitted in the 
LATEX typesetting language, the technological lingua franca of the mathematical science 
community. Past topics have included mathematical modelling of effective AIDS vaccine 
distribution, fluid mechanics with applications to oil extraction, and calculating the optimal use 
of limited internet bandwidth. A complete archive of past students’ essays may be found online 
at http://www.aims.ac.za/resources/archive.  
Although a small institute, AIMS has ambitious goals and has been largely successful at 
achieving them. First, it seeks to alleviate the “brain drain” by facilitating links between African 
universities and the rest of the world. By creating a pool of well-trained and well-connected 
scientists, AIMS helps to link Africa to the global scientific community. Second, AIMS alumni are 
encouraged to stay in contact with each other, even as they return to their countries of origin. 
In time, it is hoped that this will help build a critical mass of researchers working in 
collaboration across many regions of the continent. Third, AIMS alumni will bring to their 
home countries a new appreciation of interactive teaching and collaborative learning, which 
will help to improve secondary and post-secondary technical instruction in their home 
countries. We will now turn our attention to the specifics of this teaching method.  
Teaching Methodology  
The teaching staff at AIMS is drawn from a pool of international experts and from the finest 
universities in Africa. In fact, far more lecturers have volunteered to teach at AIMS than can 
ever be used. Each lecturer commits to spending three weeks teaching an intensive course–not 
to do their own research or to enjoy a South African holiday. Every teacher brings their own 
strengths to the course, and every lecture is unique. However, the most effective courses are 
characterised by some common factors.  
AIMS is a unique institution and calls for a unique teaching style. Because the goal is to 
create world-class researchers in the span of only nine months, only the most effective 
methods can be used. The traditional lecture format is unsuitable because it is too passive; the 
diversity of the student body demands a more personalised approach. Lecturers at AIMS are 
therefore encouraged to adopt a more interactive style. While requiring infinitely more effort 
and preparation than traditional lectures, this approach is often far more rewarding [6].  
Each entering class contains students of widely differing backgrounds, abilities and 
interests, which poses a significant challenge for the first few lecturers. The initial emphasis is 
therefore placed on improving and sharpening problem-solving skills. While many students are 
easily able to solve standard problems and recite formulae, few feel comfortable with posing 
their own questions and developing their own methods. To foster creativity, lecturers 
encourage students to work in small groups and share their ideas. This also serves to break 
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down barriers between students from different cultural backgrounds. Instead of memorising 
proofs, students are asked to devise their own. Rather than lists of formulae, students are 
presented with challenging physical problems. To develop physical intuition, students estimate 
the number of grains of sand on Muizenberg beach and work out the diameter of the moon 
based on its angular size. The introductory courses emphasise intuition, educated guessing, and 
collaboration– essential skills in the real world of science and engineering.  
Students are encouraged to break seemingly insurmountable problems down into a series 
of simple, logically related sub-problems. By the end of the introductory period students feel 
more comfortable with uncertainty and have begun to trust their own creativity. Subsequent 
courses build on this foundation, teaching students the essentials of the subject area while 
challenging them with complex assignments and projects. One former student noted, “we 
learned in a way quite unlike anything I’d experienced before... AIMS classes were interactive, 
full of questions from students, questions from lecturers.” Students are treated as peers and 
equals; the aim is to break down the traditional lecturer-student barrier in order to promote a 
more active research environment.  
This interaction is helped by the “hot-house” nature of AIMS. Students, a tutoring staff of 
4-6, visiting lecturers, and researchers all live together in one building, enabling teaching to 
happen 24 hours a day. This allows great flexibility in scheduling, particularly during the 
Ramadan months when the Muslim students must fast during the day. In addition, the 
informal nature of instruction means that it is easy to hold optional evening classes on 
anything from the history of the Sudan to programming tips to AIDS biology. Students are 
encouraged to help one another; those from Anglophone countries often help others with their 
English, and those who have a stronger background in one particular area will assist those new 
to it. Over meals and into the evening hours students and teachers discuss culture and religion 
as well as mathematics, enhancing the learning experience greatly. As one student said, “AIMS 
feels like family.”  
Free and Open-Source Software  
The AIMS computer lab runs exclusively on Free and Open Source Software (FOSS). Although 
this software is famously “free as in speech, not as in beer”, because FOS software tends to be 
inexpensive as well as easily modified, it fits in perfectly with the AIMS mission.  
Many computer labs in Africa are dependent on expensive proprietary software which 
cannot be modified or updated without considerable cost to the users. Proprietary software 
cannot be easily customised and is usually developed exclusively to serve the needs of Western 
individuals and businesses.  
Free software refers to “software which can be used, copied, studied, modified and 
redistributed without restriction”. FOSS is inexpensive and lends itself easily to customisation 
and innovation. It is therefore perfectly suitable to the needs of African scientists and 
technological innovators. Although some members of the free software community dislike the 
equating of this term with the label “open-source,” at AIMS and subsequently in this paper, we 
use the terms interchangeably. The key to the idea is to facilitate the free modification and 
distribution of source code in order to help create technological solutions relevant to African 
development.  
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The flagship example of FOSS, the Linux operating system, runs on all AIMS computers. 
Developed by Linus Torvalds, Linux provides a stable platform on which to run countless free 
software applications. It is easily installed and lends itself well to networking. Ubuntu Linux, 
the distribution used at AIMS, was developed to be especially user-friendly, and AIMS students 
receive training on how to install and introduce this system to new users. Past AIMS students 
have then gone on to secure funding for Linux or Unix-based labs at their home universities, 
which they are then well-equipped to manage.  
In addition to familiarity with the Linux environment, AIMS students learn to program in 
C, Octave, and Python, to create HTML webpages, and to use the emacs text editor and LATEX 
text processing language. These skills, in addition to being prerequisites for entry into the 
international mathematical community, allow students to begin to develop software for their 
own uses. Example projects include translating the Linux platform into various African 
languages, writing an equation solver for use in epidemiological modelling, and using Python’s 
visual mode to create educational software for basic physics lessons. In a few months, students 
who may have never seen a computer before acquire the skills needed to customise software 
for their own purposes.  
Recently, the popularity of such sites as Wikipedia and WikiTravel has drawn popular 
attention to another kind of free software, the wiki. These sites allow anyone to edit or 
contribute information. While Wikipedia, in particular, has struggled with several high-profile 
incidents of vandalism, a recent Nature study found that the accuracy and completeness of the 
site rivalled that of the venerable Encyclopaedia Britannica. Smaller wikis report little problems 
with vandalism, and allow experts to communicate with each other and to publicise new 
developments in their fields. AIMS has adopted a wiki approach to teaching programming, 
publishing editable tutorials and introductions to various FOSS applications online. These 
tutorials allow former students and experts to contribute to the education of current students, 
and are constantly monitored by the community to prevent vandalism or factually incorrect 
information from appearing.  
So why is open source software so vital for science? In the introduction to Voices from the 
Open Source Revolution, Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman, and Mark Stone point out:  
 
Science is ultimately an Open Source enterprise. The scientific method rests on a 
process of discovery, and a process of justification. For scientific results to be 
justified, they must be replicable. Replication is not possible unless the source is 
shared: the hypothesis, the test conditions, and the results. The process of discovery 
can follow many paths, and at times scientific discoveries do occur in isolation. But 
ultimately the process of discovery must be served by sharing information: enabling 
other scientists to go forward where one cannot; pollinating the ideas of others so 
that something new may grow that otherwise would not have been born [7].  
Where scientists talk of replication, Open Source programmers talk of debugging. 
Where scientists talk of discovering, Open Source programmers talk of creating. 
Ultimately, the Open Source movement is an extension of the scientific method, 
because at the heart of the computer industry lies computer science.  
 
This shared method benefits both the industrial and scientific communities. Science gains 
a ready platform for distributing its ideas, and industry gains a wellspring of freely available 
38 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007  
 
 
 
ideas and innovations from which to construct new products and services. Ultimately, the free 
availability of information will help Africa to become competitive in the global economy, as 
well as turn the focus of technological innovation towards the real problems of the continent.  
A student from the Democratic Republic of the Congo summarised the importance of 
FOSS: “Open-source is the spirit of AIMS. It stands for cooperation and helping each other. It 
opened our minds”. 
AMI-Net  
The AIMS model’s success is mostly due to the small, focused nature of the individual institute 
and of its ability to draw students and lecturers from all over the continent and the world. It is 
not initially obvious how to build upon this success. Merely enlarging the South African 
Institute would compromise the possibility for individual tutoring and interactions between 
students and faculty so integral to its success. Likewise, merely creating copies throughout the 
developing world would hinder each individual institute’s ability to draw students from outside 
its particular region. The best solution yet put forward is the African Mathematical Institutes 
Network, or AMI-Net [1]  
The stated objectives of AMI-Net are as follows:  
1. To help build a new generation of African scientists and technologists with excellent 
quantitative problem solving skills.  
2. To strengthen the teaching of mathematics and science, especially at university level.  
3. To prepare students for research across a wide range of scientific disciplines.  
4. To build a critical mass of mathematical scientists, connected via the internet and 
working in collaboration across Africa.  
The purpose of AMI-Net is to build upon and enrich existing resources. In order to 
support the NEPAD Science and Technology platforms, it is essential to develop a knowledge 
base on the continent. AMI-Net will use the Internet and Free/Open Source software to link 
several mathematical centres, or “Nodes”. Each selected Node of the Net will be equipped 
with at least 40 fast PCs, a firewall, a server, printing and copying facilities, and a generator to 
ensure availability of electricity. To securely manage this, at least one dedicated computer 
officer must be on staff. Additionally, each Node will be equipped with a library and a lecture 
theatre. Initially, AIMS will serve as the hub for this activity, and will help to facilitate the 
exchange of students and lecturers among the nodes.  
Eventually, it is hoped that AMI-Net will consist of 15-20 nodes which each serve a local 
region. We intend that the governing Board of each node will include representatives from all 
corners of the region it serves. Each node will be autonomous, but will be connected to the 
others and share resources freely. In particular, collaborations, facilitated perhaps by internet 
videoconferencing, will be encouraged in order to strengthen the network. Visiting lecturers 
from overseas will be encouraged to visit more than one Node, and student exchange 
programs will encourage inter-region collaboration.  
The process of selecting the Nodes is already in progress. Expressions of interest have 
been put forward by institutions in Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In December 2006 the AMI-Net Board, consisting of 
representatives from five regions of Africa, will begin site visits to select the initial Nodes. It is 
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expected that the initial network will consist of AIMS and three to five nodes, with additional 
nodes added on a yearly basis. Each selected node will receive a substantial grant to cover start-
up costs, but will be encouraged to seek steady sources of funding from the public or private 
sectors in the future.  
In short, the AMI-Net model replicates the success of AIMS while allowing each regional 
institute to retain a unique character. It is, we believe, an important step toward building the 
knowledge base so crucial to Africa’s sustainable development. Through excellent teaching, 
free exchange of ideas, and access to modern computer technology, AMI-Net should help 
Africa to utilise its human resources in order to realise its potential.  
Conclusion  
The African Mathematical Institute Network provides a viable framework for improving 
science and technology in Africa by focusing on the basic building block– mathematical and 
quantitative skills development. It is our hope that within twenty years the alumni of these 
institutes will constitute a large body of highly qualified, innovative scientists, university 
professors, entrepreneurs, and inventors. The graduates of AIMS, and those they teach, will be 
catalysts for changes in the African economy and security infrastructure. They will provide the 
knowledge and skills to develop creative solutions to the continent’s problems, and will be able 
to rely on a strongly connected community of other researchers that stretches beyond the 
boundaries of their countries. These benefits will come from a comparatively small investment 
financially, but will lay the foundation for a highly improved education and technology sector 
continent-wide. No single program will provide the people of Africa with security and stability, 
but it is our hope that AMI-Net will enable those with great ability to contribute greatly to their 
continent’s well-being. 
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In a world fraught with security threats ranging from terrorism to global warming, nothing 
poses a more catastrophic and imminent threat to humanity than the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. It was this realisation that led to the establishment of the Commission on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction which recently brought to the fore a comprehensive list of 
recommendations to free the world of biological, nuclear and chemical arms under four main 
areas of action, namely agreement on principles of action; reduction of the danger of present 
arsenals; prevention of proliferation and working towards the outlawing of weapons of mass 
destruction once and for all. With such a consummate framework in place, it is the 
responsibility and obligation of states to actively engage with and support the 
recommendations of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction and reverse the 
current trend to move away from cooperative multilateralism observed by the Commission’s 
Chairperson, Hans Blix [1].  
With this in mind, in order to ensure their own security whilst concurrently securing the 
global environment, African governments and specifically, the South African government, 
should work to actively support the Commission’s recommendations. South Africa’s advocacy 
for a nuclear weapons-free world was seen by its choice to willingly disarm upon ratification of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 but has, in recent times, been undermined by its 
dogmatic support of Iran’s ‘right to enrich’. The country’s possession of Africa’s only nuclear 
power station and the contentious nature of its nuclear policy confirm its need and 
responsibility to critically engage with the recommendations set out in the Commission’s 
report. The recommendations which are most important for South Africa to support lie within 
the considerations of Africa’s weaknesses, the institutionalisation of non-proliferation and the 
need for complete disarmament. These shall be analysed in detail before examining how these 
recommendations can be supported within the United Nations. Brief remarks on the use of 
incentives will precede conclusive statements on the subject, framing the Commission’s 
Recommendations to the African perspective. 
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Most important recommendations for South Africa to follow and why 
In light of pertinence and relevance of each of the sixty recommendations brought forward by 
the Commission, South Africa’s choice of which recommendations to endorse must be based 
on an awareness of the uniquely African context. 
Africa’s weaknesses 
South Africa must support the recommendations that will most show Africa to be the global 
weak link in freeing the world from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The first of 
these is:  
 
14. States must prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons or fissile 
material.  
 
Since the events of September 11 2001, terrorism has become the greatest common threat 
to human security on the planet. The African Union believes that ‘this unfortunate 
development and all its evil manifestations around the world and particularly in Africa, 
undermine the most cherished values and fundamental principles of the 21st century including 
development, democracy, human rights, and freedoms’ [2]. As non-state actors, terrorist 
organisations operate outside the bounds of international law making the indiscriminate 
wielding of nuclear weapons highly likely; Mutually Assured Destruction ceases to be a factor 
when permanent geographical bounds cannot be delineated. This recommendation to prevent 
terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons must be supported by South Africa due to 
the fact that the capacity to achieve this goal by the use of methods such as the maintenance of 
fully effective accounting and control of all stocks of fissile material is absent in Africa. This 
can been seen by the International Community’s growing concern over the terrorist-
harbouring potential of weak African states in light of the relative ease of unmonitored 
movement of people due to the porous nature of Africa’s borders. The existence of the forces 
such as the A.Q. Khan network whose supply-chain extends into North Africa and the 
numerous terrorist acts such as the US Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya as well as the 
existence of dormant terrorist cells in failed African states such as Somalia are key points of 
note to justify this rising unease. The continent’s ability to prevent terrorists from gaining 
access to nuclear weapons is undoubtedly particularly limited and warrants further 
investigation and bolstering for the benefit of global security and as such, South Africa should 
support the Commission’s recommendation to prevent terrorists from gaining access to 
nuclear weapons. 
Africa’s second area of weakness is in the biological weapons sphere where it has been 
recommended that  
 
35. Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective 
monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of 
coordinating international responses to any major event that might involve 
bioweapons.  
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The African continent is particularly vulnerable to the threat of bioweapons given the fact 
that should these weapons be unleashed on the continent, Africa has little to no capacity to 
identify, monitor and contain these weapons and has climate conditions conducive to the rapid 
spread and accumulation of viral and other infections. Currently, the governments in sub-
Saharan Africa are in a state of panic over the potential Southern Migration of Bird Flu, which 
would pose a serious health risk to the poorly-equipped continent. In South Africa, the 
Department of Health has recently been put on high alert due to the outbreak of a deadly 
mutated strain of drug-resistant tuberculosis. The fact that a considerably large number of 
Africans are immuno-compromised also facilitates the rapid spread of bioweapons. The 
existence of such a weak link extends the threat of bioweapons to the global community at 
large given the airborne nature of these weapons and the increasing mobility of peoples across 
continental divides. In this way, South Africa needs to support this recommendation by 
starting to increase its biosafety standards within the framework of the new International 
Health Regulations of the World Health Organisation. 
Need for administrative and institutional frameworks 
The Commission’s report places great emphasis and value on cooperative action in which 
treaties and international organisations are indispensable tools in achieving our common goal 
of outlawing all weapons of mass destruction. In the African context, given the relative 
weakness of African states in the global political structure, African countries have no option 
but to rely on multi-national frameworks to address issues of mutual concern. South Africa’s 
engagement with the international community has often been within a multi-lateral framework 
and as such, like the Commission, the country has placed great value on the institutional 
framework within which global decision-making takes place. This is in light of the fact that in 
an increasingly globalising world, effective and binding decisions to contain common threats 
cannot take place outside a multilateral setting, indeed, as the Commission suggests, Global 
responses to the threat of proliferation have been the most effective. The country should 
therefore support the Commission’s recommendations which place high premium on the use 
of multi-lateral institutions to arbitrate and discuss modalities for mutually beneficial 
cooperation. These recommendations are; 
 
8. States should make active use of the IAEA as a forum for exploring various ways to 
reduce proliferation risks connected with the nuclear fuel cycle.  
 
42. States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should use the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as a coordinating center in the 
development of global standards for a chemical industry security culture.  
 
4. The states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should establish a standing 
secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the treaty.  
 
60. The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to 
reduce and eliminate threat of weapons of mass destruction.  
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Towards complete disarmament 
The final category of recommendations that South Africa must support are those 
recommendations which lead towards complete nuclear disarmament;  
 
20. All states possessing nuclear weapons must address the issue of their continued 
possession of such weapons.  
 
This recommendation should be at the heart of South Africa’s nuclear policy as the 
country has demonstrated that security can still be maintained without the possession of 
nuclear arms. Indeed, as the Commission projects: 
 
30. All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security 
without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear 
weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that included definitions, 
benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament.  
 
These two recommendations are at the very core of what the Commission on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction stands for and embody the commission’s ultimate vision. For this reason 
alone, all countries including South Africa, must work to actively endorse these steps towards 
the complete nuclear disarmament of the world. This is particularly true of volatile regions 
such as the Middle East where the threat of nuclear proliferation is particularly eminent given 
the historical animosity between Israel and the Arab bloc as well as the persistent displays of 
violence exhibited in the region. However, insistence on a nuclear-free Middle East for 
example cannot be morally or legally enforced as long as nuclear weapons continue to be 
present elsewhere. The presence of double-standards within the global community strikes at 
the heart of Africa’s concerns with the current global system and the deep sense of moral 
justice embodied in the religious tensions within the Middle East nuance the conflict to an 
elevated state of volatility. Conclusively, wherever they are housed, the world cannot be truly 
free from threat as long as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons still exist and as long as a 
single state is in possession of these weapons, the world can never be safe. 
Methods to promote these recommendations within the United Nations 
As the premier institution for international cooperation and engagement, the United Nations 
has a great role to play as a forum for the discussion and arbitration of matters of global 
concern, including the threat of nuclear proliferation. There are various methods through 
which South Africa can promote support for the above-mentioned recommendations within 
the United Nations. This is in light of the fact that the country has recently been awarded a 
two year non-permanent seat on the influential United Nations Security Council starting in 
January 2007. In this capacity, South Africa can work to push the agenda of the Commission 
on Weapons of Mass Destruction using its moral weight as a state which willingly gave up its 
own nuclear program to sway public opinion. The existence of specialised subsidiary bodies 
within the Security Council, including the UN monitoring, verification and inspection 
commission are also areas in which South Africa can actively endorse the recommendations of 
the commission within the United Nations.  
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 Other methods to sway policy and lobby within the United Nations are available. 
These include active debates within the General Assembly that bring the issue of non-
proliferation to the fore. South Africa can also use its South-South cooperation networks to 
help set a collective agenda for the developing world geared towards the support of the above-
mentioned recommendations within the United Nations. The decision-making structure and 
modus-operandus of the United Nations has a wide scope of avenues for the tabling and 
critical engagement of issues of global concern. However, the most pertinent channel to 
address and promote the recommendations of the Commission is the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) which deals specifically with matters of nuclear proliferation. The 
concert of agencies, subsidiary bodies, programs and funds, specialised agencies and 
departments within the secretariat of the United Nations can each be a pertinent forum for 
specific recommendations to be endorsed and championed. 
On the use of incentives 
A key area of concern is on the use of incentives as a deterrent against nuclear enrichment. 
Recommendation 38 for example, mentions that ‘state parties should continue to offer states 
positive incentives, including technical assistance, to join and implement the Chemical 
Weapons Convention’. I am alarmed that such a practice will set a dangerous precedent 
especially considering the rise in terrorism and the nature of ‘rogue states’. An illustrative case 
in point here would be the Iranian debacle. In June 2006 the United States, China, Russia, 
France, Germany and Britain offered Iran a comprehensive set of political and economic 
incentives to cease its enrichment of uranium [3]. Iran’s recent response issued in September 
2006 shows how the use of incentives in this manner neutralises the deterrent effects of the 
threat of sanctions by giving Iran an alternative cause for ceasing enrichment. Should the 
incentives be taken up by Iran, the country, through effectively wielding the threat of nuclear 
proliferation, will come out of the incident having gained more than it would have had it not 
contemplated uranium enrichment in the first place. The precedent set in this case will be 
highly alarming as the threat of uranium enrichment can consequently be indiscriminately used 
by rogue states for the advancement of their own agendas in a manner akin to holding the 
world at ransom. I would therefore propose that incentives be removed from any negotiation 
package with states that pose a nuclear threat to send a clear message that such behaviour will 
not be rewarded or condoned in any manner and that the international community will always 
consistently take a firm stance on any attempts towards nuclear enrichment by any state in the 
future. 
Conclusion 
The greatest travesty in human history has been the manner in which over 128 million 
innocent lives were taken in the previous World Wars. These wars displayed man’s destructive 
capability and how this defies the considerations of constraint, reason and common humanity. 
This capability and the continued presence of sources of conflict amongst peoples dispels the 
myth of ‘democratic peace’ and nullifies the notion that nuclear arms merely serve as a 
disincentive for attack; these weapons have been wielded before and could once again be 
unleashed upon the world in the future. The potentially cataclysmic effects of such an action 
should be a driving force for the peoples of the world to unite against the continued existence 
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of nuclear arsenals in any shape or form. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
provides an analytical framework within which states can engage in order to rid the world of 
the sceptre of nuclear arms. As Hans Blix states, ‘the commission has not aimed at utopian 
goals but has ardently and jointly sought to exercise judgment and point to constructive 
avenues out of difficulties, which are still with us’ [1]. It is for these reasons that people from 
all walks of life must support the recommendations put forward by the commission to leave 
future generations with a legacy of peace, security and constructive engagement in the 
resolution global challenges. 
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During President’s George Bush’s visit to India in February 2006, the two countries finally 
inked the much-debated civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact [1]. The deal is the first of its 
kind, and given India’s defiance to become a member of the NPT, has caused a stir among the 
non-proliferation lobby. Notwithstanding, both the US and Indian leaderships have remained 
steadfast and continue to maintain that the deal is not only beneficial for their relationship, but 
is also a positive development for the broader non-proliferation agenda. 
Since the deal, a number of aspects of the development have been analysed by various 
quarters both within and outside South Asia. However, much of the debate seems to have 
ignored the shear breadth of the implications of this deal. Analyses thus far have tended to 
focus predominantly on most immediate concerns. In order to force the realisation of the 
broad ranging impact of this development, there is a need to undertake a holistic analysis. 
There are three points that remain key: First, how will this deal impact the major stakeholders 
and issues of international concern (non-proliferation, etc)? Second, how is Pakistan likely to 
respond to the development? Third, what does the Indo-US deal signify in its terms of the 
make-up of the geo-strategic alliances in the South Asian region over the medium term? All 
these questions are tackled briefly below. However, they are prefaced with a succinct overview 
of the deal itself.  
Elements of the Indo-US nuclear deal 
The Indo-US nuclear deal is a landmark achievement for both countries as the two leaderships 
have managed to defy heavy odds to push it through. The deal is far reaching in that it required 
changes in a number of US and international laws (these issues are discussed later).  
In essence, the deal allows the US to provide civilian nuclear technology to India, while 
India agrees to a number of stipulations designed to ensure that the technology or nuclear 
material is not siphoned off to its weapons program. On India’s part, the major obligations 
include separating its civilian and military nuclear programs and opening the civilian programs 
to the international monitoring agencies. The military program as well as stockpiles of nuclear 
fuels that India possessed at the time of the deal are exempt from any of these stipulations. 
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This is followed up by the requirement to sign an additional protocol to allow IAEA intrusive 
inspections of its civilian program. In principal, India has also agreed to negotiate possibilities 
for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty with the US. Moreover, India is to continue its nuclear 
testing moratorium, tighten its nuclear arsenal’s security and continue its ‘exceptional’ track 
record in non-proliferation. What India gets in return is dual-use technology, both know-how 
and equipment, which potentially could provide India with enriched uranium to be used in the 
nuclear weapons program [2]. However, as mentioned, under the spirit of the deal, the 
technology ought be used only to complement the civilian program.  
The key question that held the deal back at one time with rumours that the entire 
development may unfold is the extent to which the US was willing to give in on its original 
stance with regard to the actual terms of the deal. The central issue was the separation of the 
Indian civilian and military nuclear programs. The Indians were bent upon having the choice to 
determine which part of the program would be declared as ‘military’ and thus kept outside the 
purview of the deal. Of course, if the list was large enough, virtually the entire program could 
have remained secretive. Apart from the natural desire to maintain secrecy over a large chunk 
of the program, India was concerned that opening up dual-use apparatus to intrusions could 
expose its weapons program as well. This was a well-founded concern since India has never 
had any real separation between its civilian and nuclear programs.  In the final outcome, 
however, India managed a minor coup by having its fast breeder reactors designated as 
military. This was the deal clincher for many Indian strategists who argued that had the fast 
breeder program been brought under the deal’s transparency element, India would have lost an 
important source of plutonium for its military program [3]. As it stands, the terms of the deal 
are highly favourable to India. 
A cost-benefit analysis of the deal in terms of key actors and issues 
There is little doubt that the deal could potentially have far reaching consequences on a 
number of actors in the international arena. While some ‘winners’ can be identified, there are a 
number of actors and existing regimes that fall on the ‘losers’ side of the equation as well. Let 
us begin by underscoring the ‘winners’. The discussion is only limited to the most important 
beneficiaries. 
The winners 
India 
India is the principal beneficiary of this deal. While there are a number of factors that make 
this a significant achievement for the Indian government, perhaps the greatest short-term 
benefit is the legitimacy that India would acquire for its nuclear program. By concluding this 
deal, the US has moved away from self-imposed restraints on transferring nuclear technology, 
treating India as an exception and thus acknowledging the country as a de-facto nuclear power. 
The deal makes India the only country in the world that has a recognised (de facto) nuclear 
status without having entered the global non-proliferation regime. The agreement is both a 
sign of the acknowledgement of India’s responsible nature as a state and recognition of its 
stature to enter the nuclear club.  
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While some Indian analysts were wary of the deal on the grounds that it adds little to 
India’s already declared nuclear status, the fact is that nuclear ‘gate crashers’ like India and 
Pakistan acquire tremendous diplomatic leverage by gaining legitimacy of their nuclear status. 
Consider that both Pakistan and India have been longing to enter the nuclear club through a 
5+2 formula in the NPT. Moreover, in India’s case, another compelling reason to legitimise its 
nuclear status was its aspirations of becoming a global power. The current administration in 
New Delhi seems to have realised that toying with the grey areas of established international 
norms for too long is likely to be a hindrance in the country’s quest to enter the prestigious 
club. That the legitimacy came without having to come under formal legal obligations to 
adhere by all non-proliferation norms is an added bonus. 
As the deal has turned out, there is substantial room for India to manipulate the benefits 
from the US cooperation to gain in the military sphere. After all, the US would be providing 
technology, hardware and raw materials with direct applicability to the weapons program. In an 
extreme scenario, over the long run, the deal gives India the opportunity to significantly 
strengthen its nuclear weapons program by building higher capacity reactors and enhancing the 
targeting efficiency of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the de facto legitimacy would also allow 
India to proceed with its controversial nuclear programs under the cover of legitimacy with 
relative ease.  
United States 
One question that seems to have puzzled many is the US interest in pushing this deal through. 
Indeed, there seem to be little short-term gains for Washington. Moreover, there are hardly any 
tangible deal-specific gains one can identify even in the medium to long term. Through this 
deal, the US is solely looking to cement India into its alliance club to satisfy its strategic 
interests in the region. Predominantly, the Indo-US strategic partnership satisfies three US 
objectives: it allows the US to have a reliable ally in South Asia, a long standing interest it has 
failed to achieve with Pakistan; it props up India economically as well as militarily as a 
counterweight to China over the long run; and it satisfies the massive economic interests the 
US sees for itself in India. In essence, the current deal can be seen as an initial signal of 
Washington’s sincerity towards making the Indo-US relationship a lasting one.  
States with nuclear technology know-how 
A key aspect of the debate on the nuclear deal is its impact on the global non-proliferation 
regime. While the non-proliferation regime is a clear loser (we will discuss the adverse 
implications separately), it opens up tremendous avenues for other aspirants looking to share 
nuclear technology know-how for economic gains. Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s 
claims that this deal would prevent further spread of nuclear weapons, the development would 
end up opening avenues for other states to find their own markets.  
On the supply side, the immense economic interest for countries with nuclear 
technological know-how to share dual use technologies is sure to play a role in future decision 
making. On the demand side, the Bush administration’s policy of targeted intervention against 
perceived adversaries and its handling of nuclear versus non-nuclear states (North Korea 
versus Iran for example) has only incentivised the need for developing countries to get their 
hands on dual use technology [4]. The interplay is sure to allow future deals to go through, 
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whether through official exchanges in line with global norms (as the potential Russia-Iran deal 
is shaping up) or through developments, which take advantage of the loopholes in existing 
global regimes.  
One only needs to look back at the history of proliferation in South Asia to predict the 
impact of this deal on future nuclear technology exchange. Despite stringent checks and 
disapproval by the entire international community, both Pakistan and India managed to acquire 
nuclear technological know-how, the required inputs, and eventually a nuclear weapons 
capability. We have already seen nuclear capable countries other than the US (France, Russia) 
showing interest in sharing nuclear technology know-how with India. In the wake of the deal, 
New Delhi made an official request to Australia to relax rules for uranium exports. The 
incidence of such interactions is sure to increase in the future.  
The losers  
Non-proliferation 
By far the greatest implications from this deal are bound to be for the global non-proliferation 
regime. Since 9/11, courtesy of the Bush administration’s policy of pre-emption and varying 
attitudes towards nuclear versus non-nuclear states, controls over the ‘demand’ side of nuclear 
non-proliferation had already been compromised. The real hope for global non-proliferation to 
remain effective was resting on the ‘supply’ side constraints to acquiring nuclear technology. 
The Indo-US nuclear deal has ensured an unravelling of these constraints and consequently 
pushed the global non-proliferation regime even closer to its ultimate demise.  
Consider that the ‘supply’ side of proliferation was functioning at the behest of various 
legally binding protocols. The current nuclear deal necessitates exceptions in all relevant 
international protocols. The US Atomic Energy Act that regulates trade of nuclear material 
does not allow technology transfer to any country not accepting full safeguards. The Congress 
thus had to make an exception for India for the deal to go through. The Nuclear Suppliers 
Group’s multilateral export controls also do not permit such technology transfer. However, the 
NSG, in many ways the key institution responsible for supply controls has now fallen victim to 
the power play within the set-up. The stringency on export controls from the NSG is sure to 
give way in the future. Finally, the deal defies the NPT, the single most important non-
proliferation protocol. The very rationale of the NPT, which allowed peaceful nuclear 
technology in exchange for foregoing nuclear weapons, has been undermined.  
Given the above, it is no surprise that the principal opposition to the deal came from non-
proliferationists around the world (including US and Indian non-proliferation lobbies). The 
opposition camp is correct: once such regimes start to be moulded to benefit a few, others are 
sure to take advantage of the situation. US’ own non-proliferation interests in Iran and North 
Korea are likely to be undermined as they clash with other nuclear suppliers who now sense a 
window of opportunity.  
The key question then becomes if the terms of the deal could have been altered to reverse 
the impact on non-proliferation. Indeed, an analysis of the technical aspects of the deal 
suggests that the non-proliferation concern was deliberately compromised in a quest to cement 
the alliance through this flagship deal. Key non-proliferation attributes could have been 
included in a more transparent deal. First, rather than leaving the need to negotiate on the 
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FMCT open-ended, India should have been asked to cap its fissile material, even if it were 
through a bilateral arrangement. With the current arrangement, India’s indigenous uranium 
stocks will now be freed up for the weapons program. Moreover, the deal could easily have 
separated technologies and hardware that was permissible for sharing and that which could not 
be transferred. Specifically, India could have been given nuclear reactors, uranium and enriched 
fuel but not materials and technology that are more relevant to enrichment, reprocessing, and 
other sensitive fuel-cycles. The current arrangement is one of ‘full cooperation’. Finally, rather 
than creating frameworks which are exceptions to the norm, the non-proliferation community 
should think of altering legal protocols like the NSG and US regulations to allow non-sensitive 
technologies to be transferred to countries genuinely in need of civilian nuclear technology, 
whether members of the NPT or not [5]. Notwithstanding the fact that the entire deal might 
have collapsed if such stipulations were included, the overall impact of the deal might have 
been viewed favourably by non-proliferationists.  
Pakistan 
Pakistan is another major loser from the deal. The legitimacy provided by this deal to India’s 
nuclear program and the resultant diplomatic leverage it has acquired has made Pakistan’s long-
standing quest to avoid becoming a satellite state much harder. Clearly, the deal is a 
tremendous boost for India’s ambitions of becoming a global power. While to date, its conflict 
with Pakistan and its poor track record in Kashmir had evaded the recognition of its status, the 
deal has overhauled the entire scenario in India’s favour. Pakistan, already increasingly seen as a 
troublemaker in the region since Kargil, will find it even harder to sell its view vis-à-vis India. 
The relationship certainly provides added leverage to India on issues such as terrorism and 
extremism where the US, and by extension all Western powers are sure to side with New Delhi 
even more candidly in the future.  
Moreover, stances on certain issues where Pakistan and India previously held converging 
interests will now be altered. NPT is a case in point. While India’s need for a 5+2 formula still 
remains alive, it would now have subsided considerably, at least for the time being. This leaves 
Pakistan alone in the hunt to find a legitimate way into the nuclear club. New Delhi now has 
little incentive to stand on the same platform as Pakistan on the issue.  
Military disparity and nuclear stabilisation  
Strictly within the military context, there is little cause for concern for Islamabad in the short 
run. Over the long run however, the probable scenario will benefit India. The military spin off 
from the nuclear deal (presuming it takes place) will allow India to develop new categories of 
sophisticated weapon systems. The key concern for Pakistan will be the potential acquisition of 
a counter-force capability by India, which would put the former’s military assets at stake in case 
of a conflict. Pakistan, as the weaker adversary, will look to revise its force disparity and 
recalculate its force structure to counter this development. Judging by Pakistan’s traditional 
reaction to such Indian moves, it may attempt to maintain a robust second strike capability, be 
it through quantitative increase in delivery systems and warheads, or through a sea-based 
capability (the latter is by far the preferred though costlier option). In addition, the desire to 
maintain acceptable ratios of conventional force strength will remain.  
52 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007  
 
 
 
While Pakistan would ideally like to match India, whether it would be able to do so is 
debatable. The more probable outcome is that Pakistan might, despite its utmost efforts, fail to 
maintain the current ratios of asymmetry in its capabilities vis-à-vis India (we will revisit this 
scenario in the next section). Under this scenario, the relationship could become highly 
unstable with India asserting its influence upon a resentful Pakistan [6]. The other possible 
outcome is that both sides continue to upgrade their conventional and nuclear military 
capabilities at an accelerated pace. Under this scenario, the implications would become broader 
than the Indo-Pakistan context. The Indian upgrade will force China to revisit its upgrade 
plans (although China is moving in an aggressive manner on this front regardless), which then 
brings Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific into the picture. Afghanistan and Iran are new entrants into 
the South Asian strategic equation and will also react to these developments.  
The Indo-Pakistan equation 
Having discussed the implications for various actors/issues as a result of the Indo-US nuclear 
deal, we now look at the specific impact the deal is likely to have on Indo-Pak relations. We 
build on the discussion on Pakistan and the military balance above. First, one needs to realise 
that the Indo-US deal is not a stand-alone initiative; it reflects a permanent change in 
Washington’s outlook towards India. The US relationship with India and Pakistan has seesawed 
over the years as Washington has sought to protect and advance its interests in the region. 
Throughout the Cold War, and especially in the 1980s, Pakistan was a frontline US ally. The 
1990s saw a gradual tilt towards India, which climaxed with the Vajpayee-Clinton Joint Vision 
Statement, and Clinton’s subsequent visit to India in 2000. September 11 brought another U-
turn as Washington again co-opted Pakistan as a frontline ally in its War on Terror, much to 
India’s dismay. Now, while the US foreign policy has sought to get rid of the zero-sum 
relationship with India and Pakistan, it has cemented what is potentially a permanent tilt in its 
policy.  
The new Indo-US alliance holds more significance than any previous US policy overture in 
South Asia. The very scope of the Indo-US alliance suggests that cooperation is likely to extend 
in all spheres over the long-term. Acting as a counterweight to China implies that the US is 
willing to augment India’s military as well as economic capabilities. The US has already offered 
a comprehensive defence assistance pact to India. The nuclear technology transfer deal (apart 
from the option of dual use) would provide India respite from its projected energy shortage. 
The Indo-US trade relations are already strong and growing tremendously.  
Contrary to the make up of Indo-US relations, the permanence of the US relationship with 
Pakistan is questionable. In fact, the majority view suggests that while a repeat of the post-
Afghan scenario, where the US completely exited the scene, is unlikely for several reasons, there 
certainly are no structural integration patterns that would force the US to engage Pakistan at the 
same level as India. Skeptics suggest that the real meat in the Pak-US relationship will disappear 
once Pakistan’s importance in the war on terror decreases in the medium term. Others point to 
a fundamental weakness in the relationship, the so-called one-man (Musharraf) policy as 
evidence of the short-lived utility of the alliance [7].  
While much in this analysis is debatable, one fact is hard to challenge: with India, there are 
long-term strategic reasons that compel the US to move closer to New Delhi. The US has 
clearly taken India on a new platform in its relations. As already discussed, in due course this is 
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likely to allow India to create an overwhelming disparity with Pakistan, be it military or 
economic. The resulting equation would be an unstable one.  
Some analysts challenge the above premise by arguing that US determination to transform 
India into a global power will leave Pakistan with little choice but to continue on the path of 
reconciliation with India. This is so because they see Pakistan’s capability to stand up to a US-
backed India as virtually nil. The outcome would be a Pakistan willing to live in peace with its 
neighbor. This argument is flawed. First it ignores the fact that outstanding issues in larger 
conflicts are a result of structural anomalies in the Pakistan-India relationship and certain 
domestic policy formulations. They are not solvable at will. Second, one needs to consider that 
while in a bilateral hostility a state’s policies are affected by disparity in strength, it principally 
remains a function of the level of disparity. A weaker party, which faces overwhelming 
disparity in its relations with a hostile neighbor, will only succumb if it has no other recourse. 
But if it has the space to bolster their strength, it will tend to explore those rather than accept 
hegemony.  
Granted, Pakistan will seek to compromise under the new scenario. However, it will still 
not be able to give in on its principal positions on thorny issues. That requires altering various 
fundamental underpinnings of Indo-Pak relations, be they political, strategic, or cultural. 
Consider that for the past two years the two sides have been sincerely working towards 
rapprochement. Yet there has been virtually no progress on the contentious issues: Kashmir, 
Sir Creek, Siachen, Wullar barrage, and even concerns such as trade. These will still need to be 
addressed to satisfy both sides under the “overwhelming-disparity scenario” brought about by 
the Indo-US alliance, in the same way as they need to be addressed today. Increased disparity 
vis-à-vis India will not automatically force Pakistan to concede on these issues.  
The situation is compounded if one predicts India’s reaction to the increased disparity. 
India is likely to see the US backing as an assurance of a long-term quantitative shift in Indo-
Pak relations. As mentioned, to date, India is believed to have been held back from realising its 
true potential due to its conflict with Pakistan. The recent Indo-US alliance removes the 
compulsion for India to normalise with Pakistan. This is not to say peace with Pakistan will not 
remain in India’s interest. However, since India has now been accepted as a US ally without 
having to settle the Indo-Pak equation, the conflict with Pakistan at best becomes a minor 
irritant, which still needs to be tackled, but will not affect India diplomatically as it did earlier. 
Under such a situation, India would be more likely to adopt a tougher stance on key 
outstanding issues. 
The biggest shortcoming of the US move towards New Delhi is that it seems to have been 
conceived in a vacuum. Washington has ignored all collateral benefits that were possible from 
such a US offer. For instance, with an offer of this magnitude, the US could easily have pushed 
India harder to hasten the Indo-Pak peace process. Ignoring all conditionalities that were 
earlier imposed on India means that the potential benefit of ensuring South Asian stability as a 
by-product has now disappeared altogether. The US-Indo alliance and the US role in Pak-Indo 
rapprochement have unfortunately been divorced from each other. What was needed was for 
the US to find a middle ground between a zero-sum relationship with Pakistan and India, and a 
complete divorce between Indo-US and Pak-US relations. The pattern followed by the new 
Indo-US alliance suggests that Washington has moved from one extreme to the other. For the 
long-term, this spells trouble for the region as a whole. 
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The South Asian alliance structure: examining the future 
An analysis of the Indo-US deal’s impact would remain limited if the wider South Asian region 
is not studied. In this section, we consider other South Asian countries, primarily China in the 
equation. In a broader regional context, South Asia is likely to fall prey to global power politics. 
The changing structure of alliances in the region will peg regional countries against one another 
in support of their allies. The Sino-Indian-Pakistan triad holds the key in this regard. 
The nuclear deal and other military assistance programs from Washington are set to buffer 
China in the years to come. At the same time, the year 2006 has been declared the year of Sino-
Indian friendship. China and India have managed to move away from their territorial 
differences and are focusing on economic cooperation to advance their ties. The Sino-India 
model of cooperation is now perceived to have developed enough economic stake for the two 
sides to endure a long-term alliance.  
The current trend in Sino-Indian relations has tended to obscure one important factor. 
While the two sides have tremendous economic stakes, their geo-strategic interests and global 
alliances are bound to clash over the long run [8]. The economic stakes may well keep them 
away from outright confrontation, but a clash of strategic interests is sure to force them to 
continue employing various coercive diplomatic tactics against one another. The bottom line is 
that India and China are both looking to create hegemony over overlapping (if not the same) 
regions. While China’s stature has already started to peg the world’s super power against it, 
India has chosen to play on this rivalry to develop its own stake in a relationship with the US  
The Indo-US deal clearly spells trouble for China. While the official Chinese reaction to 
the deal was mellow, it is certainly in Beijing’s interest to undermine the development. China is 
as worried as anyone on the possibility of the nuclear deal benefiting India in its military 
program and would look to avoid any such possibility, even if it is not an immediate threat. 
China’s interest in this case complements Pakistan’s. The latter is as adamant as China to 
dampen the deal for reasons explained in the previous section. Pakistan has done well since 
9/11 to ferment ties with the US without allowing its relationship with Beijing to be 
compromised substantially. It therefore presents itself as an open option for Beijing to 
collaborate on the attempt.  
That Pakistan and China attempted to stall the deal before it was approved should thus 
come as no surprise. Prior to the finalisation of the Indo-US deal, Pakistan and China leaked 
reports of a deal that allowed Pakistan to purchase six to eight nuclear reactors from China. 
The real value of the news of Sino-Pakistani collaboration in this sphere was its timing. Clearly, 
this was not a coincidence. The two sides were looking to see if such a stance could compel the 
Bush administration to rethink the deal.  
Equally logical is the fact that the two sides are currently strategising on how to minimise 
the impact of the Indo-US relationship. In this regard, the Gwadar port represents the new 
‘Great Game’ in the region [9]. Pakistan has accorded China sovereign rights at the Gwadar 
port, which implies Chinese naval presence will be used to undermine the Indo-US goal of 
complete supremacy of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf regions. Beijing and Islamabad are 
also extending the Karakoram Highway to connect both countries directly with Central Asia. 
In short, while the deal cannot be undercut any longer, Beijing and Islamabad seem to have 
decided that a strategic alliance to check the Indo-US predominance in the region is the best 
recourse if the two are to be denied added influence in the region [10].  
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Currently, China is not willing to pull back on its upturn in relations with India. But if 
India gets to the point where it can threaten China, militarily as well as economically, China’s 
interest surely will prompt it to continue propping up Pakistan, at least militarily. This might 
lead to a situation under which the renewed arms build up cum chain reaction scenario 
discussed above would become a reality. The resulting strategic balance would be unstable. 
As for the rest of South Asia, the additional leverage provided to India by this new 
relationship will likely harden its stance further against smaller South Asian countries in 
contentious security and economic issues. Given that mutual suspicion of SAARC members 
towards India is a key factor in South Asia’s dismal integration record, the goal of regional 
integration is likely to remain elusive for the foreseeable future.   
So what does the ‘alliance maze’ mean for the future? The most likely scenario is as 
follows. On a bilateral level, the Sino-Indian relationship will remain cordial in the short to 
medium term. However, China will continue to build stronger ties with Pakistan and signal to 
New Delhi as well as Washington of Islamabad’s supreme importance from time to time [11]. 
The future of the Pakistan-US relationship is a big question mark but in all likelihood the two 
will continue to collaborate, albeit in an increasingly disparate framework. However, Islamabad 
would draw its lines clearly, ensuring that US pressure does not lead to the undermining of the 
Sino-Pak relationship. The overarching alliance structure will not conform to the bilateral 
arrangements. Within the next decade, the strategic balance of power in South Asia is likely to 
be defined by an Indo-US versus Sino-Pak alliance.  
Conclusions 
This paper does little more than simply putting the Indo-US nuclear deal in a broader 
perspective. The deal in itself is unique and is a testimony to the potential for a lasting Indo-US 
relationship. Given its wide-ranging implications, it is likely to affect various actors/issues 
differently. While a number of individual states are sure to gain from the development, the 
shear weight of the harm caused to the global non-proliferation regime due to the deal tilts the 
balance of the cost-benefit equation in favor of the ‘cost’ side. In essence, the non-proliferation 
goal has been compromised to benefit the national interests of two powerful states, one being 
the leader of a unipolar world.  
Interesting dynamics are likely to emerge out of this deal in terms of regional relations. 
The Indo-Pak relationship might undergo a significant reassessment over the long run, 
especially in Islamabad, which is a clear loser from this deal. The most obvious recourse for 
Pakistan would be to further strengthen the Sino-Pakistan relationship, which is likely to be 
welcome by Beijing given its uneasiness with the Indo-US deal. Overall, the regional scenario 
will see states involved in counter-alliances, virtually quashing the South Asian dream of 
regional integration. The next decade is likely to be marked by considerable strengthening of 
the Indian military and economic might, partly driven at the behest of US assistance, and a 
growing Sino-Pakistan relationship to act as a counter balance. At the same time, the US-
Pakistan and Sino-Indian relations are unlikely to come to a head.  
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Notes 
1. This paper builds upon a string of articles written by the author in The Friday Times, 
Pakistan during 2005-2006. 
2. See Esther Pan, ‘The US-India Nuclear Deal’, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2006. 
3. Praful Bidwai, ‘Snags Surface in India-US Nuclear Deal’, Antiwar Online, February 2006. 
4. See Moeed Yusuf, ‘Washington’s Non-Proliferation Focus is Misplaced’, The Friday 
Times, October 2004. 
5. See Robert Einhorn, ‘Should the US Sell Nuclear Technology to India? – Part I’, Yale 
Global Online, November 2005. 
6. The Pakistan-India relationship is discussed in detail in the next section. 
7. A number of prominent analysts in Pakistan have started taking this line. The author 
agrees with the point of view and has argued along these lines since 2003. 
8. For an apt argument in support of this thesis, see Ejaz Hadier, ‘Enter the Dragon’, The 
Friday Times, December 1, 2006. 
9. ‘Gwadar’ is a port city on Pakistan’s south-west coast. Modern port facilities, which also 
carries immense strategic importance given its geographical proximity to the Persian Gulf 
and Strait of Hurmuz, is currently under construction in Gwadar. 
10. For an extensive discussion of Pak-China relations, see Urvashi Aneja, ‘Pakistan-China 
Relations: Recent Developments (Jan-May 2006)’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
Special Report No. 26, June 2006. 
11. The Chinese president took this diplomatic stance during his State visits to India and 
Pakistan in late-November 2006. 
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Turkey’s security policy upholds nuclear (and WMD) nonproliferation and commitment to the 
regimes concerned. In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, military threats to Turkey’s 
security emanate mainly from the Middle East, where security is still defined in a Realist 
world. Turkey has several issues with its neighbours and maintains strategic balance with 
superiority or rough equality in its military power, its alliances, and to a lesser extent, 
economic ties. This paper analyses Turkey’s policy as a non-nuclear weapon state amid 
uneasy neighbours, which have had WMD and/or nuclear programs, through the lenses of 
several International Relations theories that explain proliferation dynamics: Realism, 
Liberalism, Constructivism, and other theories explaining state behaviour by opening the 
‘black box’. The analysis reveals the pillars that make up the policy including motivations and 
constraints. The post-9/11 US security and foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear program are 
independent variables that introduce intervening variables (like the effects on the regime and 
norms) which have impacts on these motivations and reconstraints. The paper distinguishes 
between (i) the presence of motivations to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, (ii) working to 
keep the ‘nuclear option’ open and (iii) the actual decision to go nuclear. The main argument 
is that the independent variables have challenged the maintenance of the policy as a security 
asset, and Turkey may consider a ‘nuclear option’ when this asset converges into a security 
deficiency. The paper concludes with recommendations to keep Turkey on the current track. 
Turkey’s security policy and non-nuclear weapon state status 
Since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey has sought alliances to maintain its security. At 
the onset of the Cold War, Turkey joined the Western camp, and became a member of the 
Atlantic Alliance in 1952. NATO membership formed the cornerstone of Turkish security 
policy by solidifying its ties to the West and by providing a nuclear umbrella. In 1979, Turkey 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, and became 
member to other agreements regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and their delivery systems.  
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This study analyses Turkey’s policy as a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) amid WMD-
capable neighbours in the Middle East. In the post-Cold War and post-September 11 (9/11) 
periods, military threats to Turkey’s national security mainly emanate from the Middle East, 
where security is still defined in Realist terms. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey pursued a 
policy of nonintervention and indifference regarding the Middle East [1]. The end of the Cold 
War, and particularly the Gulf War of 1991, demonstrated that Turkey had to revise this policy: 
while NATO did not disintegrate, its collective defence commitment was questioned during this 
period. Turkey started to engage in bilateral and trilateral strategic cooperation with the United 
States and Israel in the 1990s [2]. While earlier Turkey and the United States (US) were less than 
strategic partners, Turkish-American relations boomed in military, political and economic 
aspects as Turkey’s strategic importance for the United States increased in this period in terms 
of its regional role geographically, politically and culturally.  
Turkey’s security policy is shaped on the basis of the strategy of deterrence in the first 
place. Defence comes second [3]. Cold War and post-Cold War period security policy rested 
on the nuclear deterrent of NATO and Turkey’s military power, which is the second biggest 
army in NATO. Turkey is located at the intersection of conflict regions, namely, the Balkans, 
Caucasus and the Middle East, and that of strategic routes for trade, commerce, energy, 
etcetera. After the end of the Cold War, military threats mainly emanated from the Middle 
East, especially after the Gulf War. Relations with Syria, Iran and Iraq have been uneasy due to 
a number of issues ranging from water disputes, border issues, terrorism, mutual threat 
perceptions of regimes, Turkey’s alliances with the West, the United States and Israel, etcetera. 
All three possessed ballistic missiles that could reach strategic targets and main cities. The mass 
destruction weapons capabilities were also a cause of concern: Syria possessed chemical 
weapons, Iraq had chemical and biological weapons (CBW), and was working on a nuclear 
program before the war. Iran was suspected of having CBW capability and of working on a 
nuclear program. The absence of conflict was mainly because of Turkey’s military deterrent 
that was bolstered in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey after the Cold War [4], and the NATO 
defence commitment. Economic relations played a minor role. 
Why Turkey did not aspire to have a nuclear weapons capability was not just because of its 
deterrent capabilities, and later of its strategic relations with the United States and Israel in 
military matters. There were other elements that sustained this policy as a security asset. Next 
section will give a theoretical explanation of how Turkey’s non-nuclear weapon status was 
formed and the factors that sustained it.  
Main pillars of Turkey’s nuclear nonproliferation policy: a theoretical assessment 
Theories that explain nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation are numerous. They provide 
explanations at international, state, domestic and ideational levels [5]. Turkey’s non-nuclear 
weapon state status can be understood in the framework of these theories, and this study uses 
Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism as different lenses to look at the domestic level. I 
distinguish between motivations, that is, factors that trigger states to seek nuclear weapons; 
keeping a ‘nuclear option’ open, that is, acquiring civilian nuclear technology and keeping it in a 
way that would allow diversion to military use; and the actual decision to go nuclear, that is, a 
government decision to have an operational nuclear weapons program. The following 
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explanation is more relevant to the motivational aspect of proliferation. The next two aspects 
are discussed for the Turkish case later in the analysis.  
During the Cold War, nuclear proliferation was tackled mainly from the Realist and Neo-
Realist viewpoints that considered nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of military capability 
given the bipolar international structure [6]. Realist theories have a pessimistic view of 
international politics, in which main actors are states seeking power to ensure security for their 
survival. The ultimate national interest is power, which is understood in a military sense. States 
are in constant struggle to increase their military capabilities for security and defence, which 
creates a ‘security dilemma’ and which fuels an arms race. As a result, states either balance or 
bandwagon: they form balances of power to avoid war, and lesser powers bandwagon to 
ensure their survival. Realist theories argue that nuclear proliferation will spread as a chain 
reaction, because the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one state will initiate a security 
dilemma. Therefore, as a result of national security concerns, the acquisition by a regional 
adversary of nuclear arms or the possibility of such acquisition triggers proliferation drives, and 
states would either go nuclear to balance power, or join alliances with a nuclear power.  
In this framework, against the Soviet expansionist and nuclear threat, NATO’s nuclear 
umbrella and relations with the United States had provided Turkey with sufficient reason not 
to seek a nuclear weapons capability. The end of the Cold War did not significantly alter 
NATO’s nuclear posture. Doubts about NATO’s commitment during the Gulf War, and the 
ballistic missile and WMD programs of its neighbours challenged Turkey’s position, however, 
but there were other variables that either constrained Turkey to revise its policy, or that 
maintained it as a security asset. 
Among those factors, one can immediately notice that Turkey is a signatory to the NPT 
and all other nonproliferation WMD regimes; so first and foremost, Turkey is legally and 
politically committed to keep its NNWS status. Turkey’s international commitments go beyond 
legal constraints, and build an image of a dedicated member of the regime, and confirm the 
country’s status as an ‘accepted’ state among the community of nations. The nuclear 
nonproliferation regime was bolstered after the Cold War by the extension of the NPT, the 
denouncement of nuclear weapons by a number of states and their NPT memberships, the 
success of the UN inspections in Iraq, and cooperation between the United States and Russia to 
prevent proliferation, etcetera. Being an NNWS thus became the accepted norm of the 
international community, as opposed to the past decades, during which possession of nuclear 
weapons was a sign of prestige and status. The constructivist approach to the study of 
international relations explains the construction of identity and the evolution of norms as a 
result of social interaction [7]. In this sense, Turkey’s status was contemplated as an asset rather 
than a deficiency. 
Liberal theories are powerful in explaining why states choose not to go nuclear with their 
emphasis on cooperation, institutions and regimes. States start to cooperate for a common 
goal. Out of cooperation, they develop common rules and procedures for decisionmaking and 
resolving problems without having recourse to arms. They establish institutions and 
institutionalise these procedures; therefore they would want to continue cooperation. Neo-
Realist concern about cheating is met by the Neo-Liberal answer that state behaviour in 
institutions is a reiterated game, and not one-for-all, hence states would refrain from cheating 
to avoid punishment. Therefore, gains from cooperation override those from conflict and 
institutions are sustained [8]. Altogether, these institutions, codes of conduct, rules and norms 
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form regimes [9]. Liberal theories explain Turkey’s membership to the NPT and other 
nonproliferation regimes: the NPT aims at the total and eventual elimination of all nuclear 
weapons, and forms the cornerstone of the regime. Non-nuclear-weapon states benefit from 
negative security assurances and international cooperation to deal with proliferation risks. In 
terms of security, Turkey’s ties to the West, particularly its European Union (EU) perspective 
constitutes a political constraint, because Turkey is within a liberal zone of security with the 
West (that is, based on cooperation), and a ‘nuclear Turkey’ would be disadvantageous to 
Turkey’s EU membership bid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1. The pillars that make up Turkey’s NNWS status 
 
Motivations and constraints with regard to proliferation should also be understood by 
opening the black box. Decisionmaking theories and organisational theories are helpful in this 
respect. Bureaucracies and organisations within the state can be effective in motivating or 
constraining policymakers, because eventually the proliferation decision is taken by 
governments [10]. In Turkey, the parameters of security policy is basically shaped by the 
military, and is subject to approval by the National Security Council which has both civilian 
and military members (chaired by the President, and composed of the Prime Minister, Deputy 
Prime Ministers of National Defence, Justice, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, the Chief of 
the General Staff, Commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy and the General Commander of 
the Gendarmerie). Governments are sensitive to the public opinion, especially regarding 
national security issues. Turkey has attempted several times to transfer civilian nuclear 
technology in order to be able to generate nuclear power, but it was unsuccessful mainly due to 
international concerns and economic constraints [11]. There has not been a passionate call 
from the military, politicians or the public for Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons. However, 
the picture is transforming since 9/11. The next section looks at the effects of independent 
variables on Turkey’s NNWS status. Overall, Turkey’s NNWS policy is depicted schematically in 
figure 1. 
Turkey’s position in the post-9/11 world: what has changed? 
9/11 is a turning point for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime as a result of the 
dramatic shift in US foreign and security policy and its impacts on international politics, and on 
the definition of war and peace. The new security strategy of the United States has a new 
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definition of threat and response: the new threat is terrorism operating transnationally, seeking 
WMDs and getting support from states of concern or failed states, mainly through illicit trade of 
arms and drugs. Terrorists are regarded to wage an apocalyptic war against the United States 
and the West. Therefore, the United States and its allies aim to prevent these attacks by means 
that are not limited to military, and can bypass Cold War institutions for swift and effective 
action. Nuclear weapons are not weapons of last resort in this war against terrorism [12]. 
Beginning from the Iraq War of 2003, this new strategy deteriorated relations with allies and 
adversely affected nonproliferation efforts and regimes, for which multilateralism and 
legitimacy is essential. The Bush administration drew clear lines between ‘good and bad’, and 
called Iran, Iraq and North Korea the ‘Axis of Evil’ [13]. The US stance before the Iraq War 
adversely affected relations with the allies, and challenged the functioning of international 
institutions [14]. Iran’s nuclear program has been worrisome, and the American position did 
not help to address the issue. North Korea carried out a successful nuclear test on the grounds 
of national security reasons. Furthermore, the United States initiated nuclear cooperation with 
India.  
These developments had implications on all three main pillars that sustain Turkey’s NNWS 
position. First – regarding realist explanations which focus on Turkey’s NATO deterrent and 
military power along with the post-Cold War strategic cooperation with the United States and 
Israel –, the 2003 operation in Iraq demonstrated that the NATO collective defence guarantee 
would not come automatically, because Turkey’s request to bolster its defences in case of an 
Iraqi aggression was turned down [15]. In addition, the change in the US post-9/11 foreign and 
security policy affected relations with Turkey severely as a result of a series of misperceptions: 
Turkey refused to let the US troops use Turkish land for the Iraq Operation on March 1, 2003. 
On July 4, 2003, Turkish ‘Special Forces’ in Iraq’s north were detained by US counterparts, 
reportedly due to false intelligence from Kurdish groups [16]. This event (called the ‘Hood 
Event’ since the Turkish soldiers were detained and transported with hoods on their heads) 
caused outrage in the Turkish public because of the significance of the army in the Turkish 
security culture and that of the Special Forces, which are a special group of soldiers in the 
Turkish General Staff. Above all, Turkey has been fighting with separatist terrorism by the PKK 
since the early 1980s, which finds shelter and support in the same region. The war in Iraq led 
to a power vacuum and terrorist attacks resumed. Turkey’s expectations from the United States 
to address terrorist infiltration from Iraq’s north in order to put an end to these attacks were 
not met for at least four years. This increased resentment and anti-Americanism among the 
Turkish public. The reports that Israel is also conducting activities in Iraq’s north and 
supporting the Kurdish groups were not well received in Turkey [17]. Last but not least, the 
public opinion turned very low after the Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. All these 
developments resulted in questioning the reliability of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States 
and Israel. Anti-Americanism and anti-EU positions sentiments rose among the Turkish public 
following the tension in Turkish-American and Turkish-EU relations. 
Second, in 2003, it was revealed that Iran had made important failures in meeting the 
requirements of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and that the United States could not 
prevent North Korea to produce nuclear weapons and to withdraw from NPT membership. 
Turkey feels very strongly about the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the NPT, but these 
developments undermine the effective functioning of the regime and of the Treaty. Therefore, 
non-nuclear-weapon states started to question the effectiveness and meaning of the Treaty, 
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and that of the UN to deal with such cases. Iran and Turkey have had tough relations, and the 
absence of conflict owes to the rough strategic balance. If the international community cannot 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, it will create strong proliferation 
dynamics in the Middle East. 
Third, Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s withdrawal relate to the significance of 
nuclear weapons for the status of a state, and the international norms that evolved through the 
regime. Although they were included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ as the states of concern, if the 
international community would sink into acquiescence after the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
and withdrawal from the Treaty, that would affect the norms of the regime: possession of 
nuclear weapons would be considered as an act that could go with impunity, and non-
possession as a security deficiency. 
As a result, Turkish nonproliferation experts point to the possibility that Turkey may want 
to have the basic infrastructure to have a nuclear option, and may choose to go nuclear when 
needed and not be constrained by an ineffective Treaty [18]. However, it should be underlined 
that proliferation is a political decision, and that Turkish policymakers would need to go 
through a cost-benefit analysis – which is addressed in the next section.  
Prospects and recommendations 
Turkey has recently announced its decision to transfer civilian nuclear technology for energy 
purposes – the latest attempt in the past four decades. There are views supporting and 
opposing such transfer from energy and security viewpoints. What is relevant to this study is 
that there are those in several circles that view this transfer as a technological capability that 
would give Turkey a nuclear option in case its current policy converges to a security deficiency 
as a result of international and regional developments [19]. The assessment of such a view is 
the subject of another study, but it should be underlined that post-9/11 developments, that is, 
deteriorating relations with the United States and Israel, doubts about NATO, growing anti-
Americanism and anti-EU sentiments, Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s recent test, 
resulted in questions over Turkey’s non-nuclear-weapon state status particularly in terms of the 
effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the reliability of Turkey’s alliances 
vis-à-vis the rising proliferation of WMD in the region. 
On the other hand, a decision for Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a 
rational choice: if Turkey would decide to go nuclear, international pressure would be intense. 
Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective, which ties Turkey 
firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Becoming an EU/EC member has been a state 
policy, based on the modernisation process dating back to the Ottoman times. Turkey’s 
nuclear aspirations would jeopardise this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, 
it would have adverse effects on relations with the United States, which is an indispensable ally 
despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish 
economy, which would impair micro and macro balances. Condemnation and isolation from 
the international community would be unbearable militarily, politically and economically. What 
is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, that is, against which 
country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it were Iran, there are other more 
powerful international and regional actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against 
Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target [20]. 
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What would draw Turkey into making a choice would not only be questions on its 
alliances and threat perceptions. Turkey’s difference from the other states in the Middle East, 
which are concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, is its EU perspective. Turkey is materially 
and ideationally between the East and the West. Its EU prospects keep the country in 
cooperative mechanisms to address security issues. If this perspective is lost, it is highly likely 
that it will be drawn into the Realist zone of international security in the East, and could base 
its security policy on material capabilities. Considering the status of relations with the United 
States and the instability in the region, the country could be motivated to seek self-sufficiency, 
and perhaps to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Most of the issues that are brought forward 
in the United States and the EU accession negotiations touch upon Turkey’s national security 
referents, basically social and territorial integrity, which lead the country to take a defensive 
position and to prioritise its security interests over political goals. Thus, it is integral to 
understand Turkey’s security concerns, and to keep it in the Western liberal zone of security.  
The cases of Iran and North Korea and the way they have been tackled are not promising 
for a vigorous nuclear nonproliferation regime. The US policy after 9/11 has not been very 
helpful: the new strategy does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons, hence it legitimises 
them as an instrument of statecraft. On the other hand, there were proposals to revise the NPT 
in a way that would prevent proliferation by denying the transfer of sensitive technologies 
(which were also endorsed by the Director General of the IAEA [21]), but the proposed 
amendments are likely to be opposed on the grounds that it would not strengthen the Treaty, 
and rather lead to rifts, mainly due to economic concerns [22]. Multilateralism is pivotal in 
keeping a strong regime. As the United States gave up working by consensus following 9/11, 
relations with allies soured, leading to a tendency to shift from the neo-liberal bases of 
international politics to a more realist one, in which states would be inclined to provide self-
help and turn inwards, as it is the case with Iran and North Korea. Nuclear weapons have been 
those of deterrence, and to keep it stable, the United States and the Soviet Union had spent 
great effort. New nuclear powers will be inexperienced in crisis management, which would 
increase risks of misuse or accident. 
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Nuclear weapons should no longer be considered by those who possess them as assets, but as 
liabilities. They certainly constitute a negative factor in the Middle East conflict. It is a public 
secret that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. Israel decided about 1955 to start a programme of 
building nuclear weapons in contacts of the Israeli prime minister Ben Gurion with nuclear 
physicists (private information HT) – understandable because of the threat of its neighbours 
(see also the books by Seymour Hersch [1] and Avner Cohen [2]). A long time the 
development, production, and storage of Israeli nuclear weapons in Dimona (near Beerseva) 
was a so-called ‘secret’ (a ‘public secret’) and its official negation was an obvious lie. Israel has 
not become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
In contrast, Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, according to International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and ratified the NPT in 1970. Still, there is significant worry within the 
international community that the civilian nuclear fuel cycle that Iran is currently erecting may 
be diverted into military programmes. The fact that Israel has such weapons may indeed 
induce in other countries in the region a desire to acquire nuclear weapons too. Therefore the 
time now really has come to seriously start working on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the 
Middle East [3].  
We should implement all possible means to de-escalate the risk of a ‘clash of civilisations’. 
It would be better to have a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East, if not only for 
decreasing the risk that terrorist groups obtain nuclear weapons or the capability to produce 
them. There are many reasons that make a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East 
desirable. Particularly at this moment in time it could catalyse the peace process instead of 
waiting for the peace process to achieve results first. Israel should take the lead, is our claim. If 
Israel would decide to de-nuclearise, this would provide a great impetus to the Middle East 
peace process. Since the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East is 
part of a wider political setting, we also offer a few ideas for the Israeli–Palestinian peace 
process. Finally, some remarks are made about the Israel–Lebanon conflict and about the role 
of Pugwash in the Middle East in general. 
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The responsibility for Israel to de-nuclearise 
Just before the NPT regime came into being in 1970, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir 
and US President Richard Nixon reached an agreement in September 1969 that Israel would 
not declare its nuclear status, would not test its weapons, and would not use its nuclear 
capability for diplomatic gains. In return, the US stopped pushing Israel to give up its nuclear 
weapon, which it had developed with the help of French engineers in the 1950s and 1960s [2]. 
Thus Israel could continue its doctrine of ‘nuclear opacity’, defined by Cohen as ‘a situation in 
which a state’s nuclear capability has not been acknowledged, but is recognized in a way that 
influences other nations’ perceptions and actions’ [2, p. 2].  
By keeping a low profile, Israel managed to keep the Arab countries at bay. It was believed 
that if the Arabs became convinced that Israel was developing nuclear weapons, they would 
launch a pre-emptive attack on its nuclear installations at Dimona [2, p. 5]. It was only in 
recent years, since the first Gulf War, that the Arabs ‘have stopped playing their roles in the 
game of opacity’ [2, p. 346]. For instance, Egypt now publicly considers Israel a nuclear-
weapon state and has given new life to the discussions on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. 
Egypt has insisted that ‘tangible progress in the nuclear discussions be achieved in parallel to 
progress in the peace negotiations’ [2, p. 346] Currently, it seems, however, that ‘Israeli leaders 
consider nuclear weapons indispensable to Israeli security and to the architecture of peace’ [2, 
p. 346]. 
The fact that there is censorship on these issues within Israel does not make it possible for 
Israelis to reach democratic decisions on the issue of nuclear weapons. In the current situation, 
the Israeli leaders should come to realise that nuclear weapons do not deter the groups that 
threaten their country. Nuclear weapons are not even of practical military use for Israel.  
But how should the de-nuclearisation of Israel start? A first step could be to bring Israel, 
Pakistan and India (and possibly North Korea) into the international non-proliferation regime 
by way of a ‘form of associate membership under a separate, free-standing agreement or 
protocol’ [4, p. 44]. This would be a way of acknowledging the current nuclear status without 
amending the NPT itself, which is considered to be politically impossible. And this would make 
it possible for Israel to de-nuclearise under international control. We thus envisage that Israel’s 
formal status as a nuclear-weapon state would be temporary until a Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone becomes effective in the Middle East. These thoughts are offered here as a mere 
suggestion. Much work needs to be invested before such a scenario might become reality. 
The larger context: some ideas for the Israeli–Palestinian–Lebanon peace process 
The creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East should be considered as 
a part of a larger peace process. Of pivotal importance is a reconciliation between Israelis and 
the Palestinians, including Hamas, as well as between Israelis and Lebanese. Although we do 
not attempt to extensively analyse the situation in Lebanon, we would like to cite some 
passages from a letter by Professor Muhsin Harakeh, director of the Netherlands Nuclear 
Physics Accelerator Institute (KVI) in Groningen, who was born in Lebanon (Beirut). In his 
letter to one of us (HT), he writes: 
 
This aggression of Israel on Lebanon had made the chances for peace in the Middle 
East again smaller. However, it is not only Israel which should be blamed. The 
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American Administration has more blood on their hands. They could have stopped 
the hostilities immediately, but they have chosen to provide Israel with heavier 
bombs, thinking that they could administer a deadly blow to Hezbollah in this way. 
This has not succeeded, the opposite has happened: Hezbollah has become stronger 
and obtains more support than before this war. . . . 
The damage which was caused to the infrastructure in Lebanon is enormous, but I 
find much worse the large number of innocent victims (mostly children and elderly 
people) who were killed as a consequence of the bombardments on civil targets. The 
use of ‘cluster bombs’ by Israel still causes victims every day, and again mostly 
children because they cannot realise that these bombs are so dangerous.  
 
It is heartbreaking to have watched how in the summer of 2006 the war between Israel 
and Hezbollah in Lebanon escalated to a humanly unacceptable level. It was right for Pugwash 
to protest. The Pugwash Council statement of 21 July 2006 called on all parties to arrive at a 
ceasefire. The Cairo Conference in November 2006 provided an opportunity to jointly define 
further actions that Pugwash should take vis-à-vis the problematique in the Middle East. 
The violent conflict since 1948 between the Jews in Israel and the Palestinians is a shame 
for both the Jews in Israel as well as for their semitic brothers, the Palestinians. Both parties 
should strive for shalom=salam (peace). The recent escalations of the conflict are most 
regrettable causes of much misery for the affected populations. An analogous statement should 
be made about the conflict in Lebanon. 
The United Nations, its Security Council and the highest authorities in the political and 
religious world should make an unprecedented effort to avoid further escalation of both these 
conflicts. A possibility would be the creation of a UN organisation for peace in Israel–Palestine. 
We advocate that those Pugwashites who are most competent in these matters participate in 
this effort. We think also that the top figures of the Christian, Jewish and Muslim religions 
should participate as well as Nobel Peace prize winners. The aim should be a two-state 
solution: Israel and a state for the Palestinians, with democratic parliaments, full memberships 
of the UN, and well-defined frontiers. The only exception might be Jerusalem; this city (with 
part of its surroundings) might become an international Peace region not belonging to either 
state.  
In order to reach this goal and have permanent peace in the Middle East one should 
accomplish the enormously difficult process of reconciliation between Jews, Palestinians and 
Lebanese. This might be started by the proposed Pugwash–UN efforts. Possibilities to promote 
this process could consist, e.g., in mixed (Jewish–Palestinian) organisations to further this 
crucial goal. One might think of town-relationships between Jewish and Palestinian towns, etc. 
Most important would be mixed organisations for the problems of water and energy (oil, solar 
energy, etc.) in the Middle East. 
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In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 confrontation between Islam and the West was 
brought to the forefront of international relations. According to Samuel Huntington, author of 
Clash of Civilizations, the roots of the antagonism between those civilizations lie in the 
significant growth of the Islamic population, belief in uniqueness and superiority of Islam over 
the Western culture and disapproval caused among Muslims by aspirations of the West to give 
to their values universal dimension. 
This dispute does not necessarily regard territorial problems, but it concentrates on issues 
such as WMD proliferation, human rights, democracy, supervision over oil and gas fields and 
terrorism. According to Huntington, Muslims accuse the West of hypocrisy and of using 
double standards, and consider the Western culture to be materialistic, imperialistic, decadent 
and corrupt. American leaders presume that Muslims who take part in and are responsible for 
acts of violence against the West, represent the minority, and the majority of them is opposed 
and condemn that sham-war. This view seems to hold, but it runs counter to Huntington’s 
idea of a clash of civilizations – according to which one would expect neither protests in 
Muslim countries nor leaders who strongly condemd anti-western acts of violence. 
Actually, one of the first world leaders who publicly condemned the terrorist attacks of 
the 11th September and offered condolences to the victims’ families and to the whole 
American nation, was the then President of the Islamic Republic of Iran – Sayed Mohammad 
Khatami. That man also, in 1998 (the first year of his presidency), had presented to the UN 
General Assembly his idea of Dialogue among Civilizations and had appealed for establishing 
the year 2001 as the year of that dialogue. A year later, Mr. Khatami held his first state visit to 
Europe, to Rome, where he met not only with the Italian President and the representatives of 
the Italian government, but also met with Pope John Paul II in the Vatican, to whom he 
presented the idea of Dialogue among Civilizations. That meeting, according to observers, in a 
symbolic way identified Khatami as a leader of the Islamic world, welcomed by the ‘head’ of 
the Catholic Church, the biggest Christian community. In the report on the role of the 
leadership in the Dialogue among Civilizations prepared during the United National University 
workshops on the topic in 2001, international experts stated that the progressive world of 
inter-civilizational dialogue will witness many efforts of promoting mutual understanding and 
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understanding among cultures, for which John Paul II and Mohammad Khatami will be 
recognised as precursors [1]. 
According to Mohammad Khatami, the Dialogue among Civilizations would be an 
accomplishment of the principles of the universal justice and freedom, promotion of the 
cultural, economic and political understanding and refusal to use force. It would strengthen the 
foundations of justice, freedom and human rights. Due to Iranian president there are two 
conceptions of Dialogue among Civilizations. 
One of these presumes mutual interaction and leakage of cultures and civilizations, which 
comes out of the diversity of elements that comprise them. This way of interaction is 
unintentional, spontaneous and mainly dominated by social events, geographical situations and 
historical development. 
Dialogue among Civilizations may also, according to Khatami, mean serious discourse 
among representative members such as scholars, artists and intellectuals from different 
civilizations. In that second meaning, dialogue is an intentional process that aims at mutual 
agreement and cautious debates. Meta-historical discussion on everlasting human questions like 
fundamental meaning of life and death or good and evil should be specified and should 
brighten political and social problems. This discussion cannot disguise authentic, urgent and 
essential issues, but should be conducive to mutual understanding in fundamental and true 
issues. 
President Khatami in his statements reiterated that as a Muslim he strongly believes that 
the importance of religion has its roots in the value of justice; it was justice that was the main 
basis of all divine religions. Khatami argues that dialogue among civilizations is definitely 
dialogue among believers, thus is a dialogue among religions. 
The idea of the former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be also found in the 
Tehran Declaration adopted in 1999 by members of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference. According to its signatories the main principles of Dialogue among Civilizations 
are inter alia: 
 
• Respect for the dignity and equality of all human beings without distinctions of any 
kind and of any nations large and small; 
• Genuine acceptance of cultural diversity as a permanent element of human society 
and a cherished asset for the advancement and welfare of humanity at large; 
• Mutual respect and tolerance for the views and values of various cultures and 
civilizations, as well as the right of members of all civilizations to preserve their 
cultural heritage and values, and rejection of desecration of moral, religious or 
cultural values, sanctities and sanctuaries; 
• Rejection of attempts for cultural domination and imposition as well as doctrines 
and practices promoting confrontation and clash between civilizations; 
• Search for common grounds between and within various civilizations in order to 
face common global challenges; 
• Acceptance of cooperation and search for understanding as the appropriate 
mechanism for the promotion of common universal values as well as for the 
suppression of global threats; 
• Compliance with principles of justice, equity, peace and solidarity as well as 
fundamental principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. 
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•  
Areas of Dialogue among civilizations are: 
 
• Enhancement of mutual understanding and knowledge about various civilizations; 
• Cooperation and mutual enrichment in various fields of human endeavour and 
achievements: scientific, technological, cultural, social, political, economic, 
security… 
• Promotion of the culture of tolerance and respect of diversity; 
• Cooperation to arrest threats to global peace, security and well being: environmental 
degradation, conflicts, arms, drugs, terrorism, et cetera 
• Confidence-building at regional and global levels; 
• Promotion and protection of human rights and human responsibility, including the 
rights of minorities and migrants to maintain their cultural identity and observe their 
values and traditions; 
• Promotion and protection of the rights and dignity of women, safeguarding the 
institution of the family, and protection of the vulnerable segments of the human 
populations: the children, the youth and the elderly [2]. 
 
Participants in dialogue are, among others, representatives of contemporary civilizations, 
scholars, thinkers, intellectuals, scientists, economists, people of arts and culture, 
representatives of governments, civil society, international and organizations.  
In accordance with the principles presented above, conferences and symposia designed to 
encourage dialogue and promote mutual understanding and tolerance among contemporary 
civilizations should be sponsored. Various cultural products, such as books, articles, 
documentaries and audio-visual products, projecting the true message of Islam and depicting 
from the numerous historical instances of constructive interaction between Islamic and other 
civilizations should be produced. Inter-cultural studies and exchanges at institutions of higher 
learning should be enhanced and historical and cultural tourism should be utilised as an 
instrument of dialogue and understanding among civilizations. 
Not only Islamic organizations like OIC or Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (ISESCO) in their activities have referred to the idea of Dialogue among 
Civilizations. Through adopting the resolution in 1998 and establishing the year 2001 as a year 
of Dialogue among Civilizations, the UN General Assembly rejected the idea of a Clash of 
Civilizations which was based on the thesis that understanding among civilizations is not 
possible. The UN General Assembly expressed its strong determination to commence such a 
dialogue to promote the active exchange of ideas, views and aspirations, and to raise 
understanding and tolerance among people of various cultures.  
For the representatives of the UN General Assembly, the idea of Dialogue among 
Civilizations became a new paradigm in international relations that is based, inter alia, on: 
 
• Reciprocal relations based on equality; 
• Dispersion of power 
• Individual responsibility in international relations; 
• Partnership [3]. 
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Dialogue seems to be vital for supporting these aspirations. Its condition is the 
maintenance of diversity, which will preserve the human face of globalisation. 
 The subject of the Clash of Civilizations, and particularly relations between Islamic 
world and the West, has also been discussed by AbdolKarim Soroush, a well-known and 
influential Iranian philosopher. Referring to Huntington’s conception, Soroush maintains that 
there are two kinds of Islam. The first kind, known as the Islam of identity, is a guise for 
cultural identity and a response to what is defined as a ‘crisis of identity’. The second kind, 
called the Islam of truth, is a repository of truths that direct believers toward the path of 
worldly and outwardly salvation. Soroush expresses his concern that Muslims in ‘their 
confrontation with the Western civilization wish to turn to Islam understood as an identity’. 
His concern arises out of the fact that he deems the identity-based Islam as one of the greatest 
theoretical plagues of the Islamic word. In response to this plague, Soroush proposes that 
‘Islam of identity should yield to the Islam of truth’, because Islam as a truth can co-exist with 
other truths, while Islam as identity is by its very nature agressive. Soroush argues that two 
identities would fight each other, while two truths would cooperate. The problem is that Islam 
has generated a civilization which has different shades in different parts of the world. So it is 
very hard to find one effective solution [4]. 
 AbdolKarim Soroush believes that Islam should engage in a constructive cultural 
exchange with the West instead of adopting Western culture uncritically as a means to 
development and progress. The Iranian philosopher argues that there is no shame in choosing 
to maintain or abandon certain elements of one’s culture on the basis of investigation or 
critical inquiry. Blind imitation, in his opinion, should be rejected for the rational search for 
truth. We can also find in Soroush’s texts a call for a dialogue that aims to prevent conflict 
within the Muslim world. Extremist forces in that world can only be defeated if progressive 
forces both in the West and in the Islamic world cooperate to tackle the issue through dialogue 
and constructive engagement. 
 Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, scholar from the California University in Berkeley, believes that 
in today’s world – wrought with severe challenges for peace and prosperity, wherein the 
integrationist forces of globalisation coexist with the polarising forces of global poverty, ethnic 
cleansing and other forms of intolerance – Khatami’s idea of Dialogue among Civilizations 
could be an antidote to the violence of its antinomy – the Clash of Civilizations thesis. In the 
latter’s source, we can find theses about western superiority, domineering, arrogance and 
cultural hostility. The theory on Clash of Civilizations is a low-level vision cementing the global 
fragmentations. According to Afrasiabi, Khatami’s antithesis represents a high-level vision 
addressing our global need to rebound intellectually and otherwise. Afrasiabi reckons that the 
idea of Dialogue among Civilizations invokes the notions of interfaith dialogue and religious 
hope, thus setting a unique precedent for the re-enchantment of the United Nations, which 
had previously ejected religion and spirituality outside its policy domains.  
 The Dialogue among Civilizations has not been suppressed in the aftermath of the 
September 11th attacks. Global and regional undertakings such as Sana’a conference in Yemen 
in 2004 (resulting in ‘The Sana’a Call for Dialogue among Civilizations’), the International 
Conference on Environment, Peace and Dialogue among Civilizations (Tehran, 2005), the 
Conference on Fostering Dialogue among Civilizations through Concrete and Sustained 
Actions (Morocco, 2005) or the ‘White book on Dialogue among Civilizations’ [5] (which 
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consists of almost all official documents, reports from conferences relating to Dialogue among 
Civilizations) can testify to this.  
 Two European examples may also illustrate this point. In 2002, Germany presented a 
project on Dialogue with the Islamic world. Its aim was to undertake the discussion on values, 
opinions and views, without attempting to avoid controversial issues. One of the priorities of 
that project was the dialogue at schools and, more broadly in the educational sphere, with 
youths. That Dialogue had been constructed in a way such that exchange among cultures could 
be recognised as an opportunity that enriches both sides. Dialogue with the Muslim world 
ought to be one of the pillars of a long-term strategy for the fight against terrorism and the 
prevention of crises. And in 2003, within the framework of the Barcelona Process (Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership), the Euro Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue 
between Cultures was brought into existence. This Foundation is the first common institution 
established by all 35 members of the Partnership and aims to bring people from south and east 
coats of the Mediterranean Sea closer to each other and to transform the Euro Mediterranean 
region into a region of peace, stability and prosperity. 
 Sayed Mohammad Khatami with presenting his idea of Dialogue among Civilizations 
strove for reinforcing not only his own position, but also the position of Iran in the global 
arena. He wanted to help his country to come out of the international isolation. Of course 
almost all of his guidelines remain in the theory. But they do play a role in discussions, 
considerations and challenges. They are acknowledged and supported by politicians and world 
leaders. They give aims, to which citizens of all civilizations should aspire, that is, aspire to the 
dialogue, not to the confrontation. 
 What seems to be very important is that the idea of Dialogue among Civilizations, 
opposite to the Clash of Civilizations, was put forward by a Muslim man that represents the 
civilization which is considered by the West as an aggressive, fundamentalist civilization, not 
eager for dialogue and compromises. A man from the East, cradle of civilizations, place where 
prophets of the three monotheistic religions – Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mahomet – were 
born. 
 The problem is that there is no will for real understanding of the Islamic world by the 
West. Proposals for dialogue, mainly from Europe, remain largely in theory. There is a lack of 
realisation of the aims. Western countries seem to perfectly know all about the other side in the 
dialogue. So they do not need to listen and be interested in problems of the Muslim world. For 
establishing true dialogue there is a need for a western charismatic leader, who, like 
Mohammad Khatami, would make an effort to promote the idea of Dialogue among 
Civilizations all over the world, to adjust it to the new challenges. However in Europe there is 
no possibility for a clergyman to become head of a country, which may hinder the possibility 
of a western alter ego of a man like Khatami to rise to power. Furthermore, when Mohammad 
Khatami desisted from being the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the cogency of his 
message became weak. He is invited, like many other former presidents, to universities all over 
the world, even to the United States, to give lectures on Dialogue among Civilizations, but it 
does not have the might of interaction. 
 In the opinion of many observers, scholars and intellectuals, dialogue between Islam 
and the West, in today’s socio-political circumstances, both in the Middle East and in Europe, 
is impossible. Is the path of a dialogue possible to be continued, to be developed? What should 
be done to make it possible? Is it possible to create a platform of cooperation between 
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nongovernmental organisations from both sides? What should be done for putting the 
assumptions of the initiatives by Khatami, the OIC, and ISESCO into practice? Should we talk 
only to moderate Islamists, who are usually in opposition to rulers in some Muslim countries? 
Or should we talk to representatives of all Islamic fractions? Is practical implementation of the 
assumptions behind the dialogue possible? These questions need urgent answers. 
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